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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and 
corporate governance changes on the firm’s performance. The first paper utilizes a cost 
minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total 
compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, 
on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by 
around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the 
likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases 
managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with 
managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation 
is not significantly inversely related to the firm’s future performance, it has an indirect negative 
effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. 
Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with 
a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the 
board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring 
mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the 
expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes 
on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the 
post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent 
directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a 
negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that 
our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify 
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their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators’ objectives, 
we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted 
an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines 
the relationship between the firm’s governance structure and its value during different economic 
conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during 
economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment 
have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While 
industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces 
shareholders’ wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, 
outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession 
provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more 
private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and 
governance changes on the value of the firm. Essay one employs a cost minimization stochastic 
frontier methodology to estimate director excess compensation. The stochastic frontier approach 
permits the estimation of excess compensation by dividing the conventional composite error term 
into two components: (i) the one-sided inefficiency term; and (ii) the two-sided random error 
term that accounts for measurement error. Accordingly, excess compensation is represented by 
the non-negative inefficiency term which measures the divergence of actual compensation from 
the efficient compensation frontier. Our findings highlight a substantial inefficiency in the total 
compensation of directors. During 1996-2006, on average, directors are overpaid by 
approximately 63% relative to their benchmark efficient level. In addition, we show that an 
increase in the overcompensation of directors leads to a decrease in the likelihood of CEO 
turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. 
Therefore, we propose that the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with CEO 
immunity and entrenchment. In addition, we show that the excessive compensation of directors 
has an indirect effect on the firm’s future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-
performance relationship. That is, we suggest that the relation between managerial entrenchment 
and firm performance is negative and significant only when board members receive high excess 
compensation. Thus, we propose that director excess compensation signals the presence of some 
sort of a collusion and back-scratching relationship between the manager of the firm and his/her 
directors. Essay two investigates a unique event whereby firms experience an exogenous shock 
regarding the minimum participation of independent directors on the board. Thus, we examine 
whether the change in board structure, due to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 
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2002, attains its intended objectives by enhancing the soundness of the firms’ governance 
structure. Our findings highlight a noticeable and significant increase in the percentage of 
independent directors at the expense of insiders, following the passage of SOX. In addition, our 
results suggest a significant reduction in the likelihood of CEO turnover during the post-SOX 
period. We also show that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely 
to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we demonstrate that the change in board 
structure has a negative effect on firm value. Accordingly, we propose that forcing firms away 
from their endogenously determined board structures has a converse effect on the shareholders’ 
interests and wealth. Therefore, contrary to the legislators’ objectives, we suggest that the change 
in board composition brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff 
between independent directors and insiders. Essay three investigates the effect of economic 
downturns on the relation between the firm’s governance structure and its value. We demonstrate 
that business cycle fluctuations have a substantive influence on the soundness of the firm’s 
governance structure. The essay suggests that managers may be subject to higher industry 
pressure during a recession due to the increase in relative industry turnover. On the other hand, 
we demonstrate that managers are more entrenched during economic downturns. That is, bad 
economic conditions amplify the manager’s influence and authority within the firm.  Finally, we 
show that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the 
value of the firm during poor economic conditions. While industry turnover has a positive impact 
on firm performance, managerial entrenchment is negatively associated with firm performance. 
However, our results show that, during bad macroeconomic conditions, the negative impact of 
entrenchment on firm value outweighs the positive impact of turnover. Thus, we propose that 
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economic downturns provide the managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior 
and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on the economy. 
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ESSAY 1: EXCESS COMPENSATION AS A SIGN OF BOARD 
ENTRENCHMENT: A STOCHASTIC FRONTIER APPROACH 
1. Introduction 
Are board members overpaid? Does the board culture promote some sort of collusion or 
mutual back-scratching between the directors and the CEO? If so, how is firm performance 
affected by such a board environment? These issues have received increased attention by finance 
scholars. This paper addresses these questions by utilizing a cost minimization stochastic frontier 
approach to estimate the efficiency of director total compensation. Frontier analysis allows for 
the investigation of the presence and magnitude of excess compensation. In addition, we 
examine whether superfluous director compensation affects the soundness of the firms’ 
governance structure and performance.  
Prior literature suggests that excessive compensation is not beneficial to shareholders. 
Core et al. (1999) highlight a negative relation between the predicted component of CEO 
compensation and the firm’s future performance. They also show that CEOs in firms where the 
agency problems are more pronounced have higher compensation levels. Moreover, they suggest 
that firms are expected to perform worse when the agency problems are more severe. Brick et al. 
(2006) propose a direct and significant relation between director excess compensation and CEO 
excess compensation. Furthermore, they document an inverse relation between the firms’ future 
performance and the excessive compensation of both the CEOs and the directors. They suggest 
that their results are mainly due to weak corporate governance and back-scratching between the 
CEO and the board members, that is, “cronyism”. These findings are consistent with Jensen 
(1993) who proposes that the board environment might prevent productive and effective 
monitoring.  
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Brick et al. (2006) define excess compensation as the difference between the observed 
compensation level and the expected compensation level after controlling for firm, governance, 
and CEO characteristics. That is, excess compensation is the residuals obtained from performing 
a regression of realized compensation on the variables hypothesized to explain compensation. 
However, the difference between actual and predicted compensation might just be due to 
estimation error. Thus, the error term may be representing excess compensation, statistical noise 
induced by some random factors or outliers, or a combination of both. In this paper, we employ a 
stochastic frontier approach to differentiate between excess compensation and random noise. 
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) allows for the estimation of excess compensation, after 
controlling for measurement error, by introducing a systematic nonnegative error term. That is, 
by dividing the conventional composite error component into two components: (i) the one-sided 
inefficiency term; and (ii) the two-sided random error term that accounts for noise or estimation 
error. Stochastic frontier cost minimization analysis assumes that there exists a minimum 
compensation, for a given opportunity set, and that the observed compensation lies on or above 
that efficient frontier level. In such a case, the nonnegative inefficiency term measures the 
divergence of actual compensation from its benchmark efficient level. Therefore, the stochastic 
frontier methodology facilitates the measurement of excess compensation by allowing for a 
comparison between the realized compensation level and the efficient compensation frontier.  
This study utilizes a stochastic frontier methodology to estimate excess compensation for 
the 1996-2006 period. We also split the whole sample period into two subsamples: 1996-2001 
and 2002-2006. This allows for the examination of the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
on the efficiency of director compensation as well as the association between excess 
compensation and the firm’s corporate governance and performance. Following the business 
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scandals in the early 2000s (Enron, Adelphia, Tyco, WorldCom, etc.), the U.S. Congress enacted 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an attempt to improve internal monitoring and the soundness of the 
firm’s governance structure. However, the effectiveness of the legislation has been questioned.1   
We start by investigating the efficiency of director total compensation. The stochastic 
frontier results suggest that director total compensation is not efficient. That is, in general, 
directors receive compensation that is in surplus to their efficient compensation level. During 
1996-2006, the mean director compensation is approximately 63% above their efficient 
compensation frontier. Therefore, on average, directors are paid around $33,135 in excess of 
their benchmark compensation. Moreover, we document a decline in director overcompensation 
of approximately 36.5% in the post-SOX period, as opposed to the pre-SOX period.  
While Brick et al. (2006) document a positive association between director and CEO 
excess compensation; we complement their work by investigating the relation between director 
overcompensation and other forms of “cronyism”. In other words, we focus our research on 
director excess compensation and its implications on the firm’s internal monitoring and 
performance. Overcompensation may act as an incentive for board members to exert more effort 
and, thus, improve the soundness of the firm’s governance structure. On the other hand, the 
surplus in director compensation might signal that directors are entrenched and not effective 
monitors and, consequently, lead to “cronyism” between the CEO and the board members. 
Accordingly, we focus on the effect of director excess compensation on internal monitoring by 
examining CEO turnover and the turnover-performance sensitivity.
2
 Moreover, we study the 
                                                 
1
 In general, the literature provides mixed evidence on the efficiency and effectiveness of the SOX regulation. 
2
 Since directors are required to monitor the manager’s actions and behavior, they are expected to dismiss CEOs 
who: (i) are ineffective or do not possess the necessary skill and knowledge to run the firm; and/or (ii) engage in 
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effect of director overcompensation on managerial entrenchment, as proxied by both the G-Index 
and E-Index. 
Our results suggest an inverse relation between director excess compensation and CEO 
turnover. That is, an increase in director excess compensation lowers the probability of CEO 
dismissal. We also find that the manager’s contract is less likely to be terminated due to poor 
performance when directors receive high excess compensation. Therefore, the overpayment of 
board members provides the CEO with additional immunity and job security. Consequently, we 
also investigate the impact of director excess compensation on CEO entrenchment. In general, 
our results highlight a direct relationship between the overcompensation of directors and 
managerial entrenchment. These findings suggest that director excess compensation can be 
interpreted as a sign of board entrenchment and, thus, it is associated with a board environment 
dominated by mutual back-scratching between the CEO and the board members. However, in the 
post-SOX period, our results are not as significant.  
Finally, we examine the relation between director overcompensation and the firm’s future 
performance. While we find an insignificant negative relation between the overpayment of board 
members and the firm’s future abnormal returns, we do show that the excessive compensation of 
directors has an indirect effect on the firm’s performance through its impact on the 
entrenchment-performance relationship. During the full sample period and the pre-SOX period, 
we find that the impact of managerial entrenchment on future performance is negative and 
significant only when board members receive high excess compensation. Specifically, our results 
suggest that a reduction in the firm’s future performance occurs only when both the CEO and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
fraudulent and manipulation activities. Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) focus on CEO turnover as a measure or 
indicator of the quality of internal monitoring. 
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directors are entrenched. The results are again not as significant during the post-SOX period, 
suggesting that SOX may have reduced the negative impact of director overcompensation on 
board culture. 
The remaining parts of our paper are organized as follows. Section 2 explains the 
stochastic frontier methodology. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 
examines the efficiency of director total compensation. Section 5 studies the impact of director 
excess compensation on CEO turnover, turnover-performance sensitivity, and entrenchment. 
Section 6 investigates the effect of the surplus in director compensation on the firm’s future 
performance and the entrenchment-performance relationship. Section 7 provides robustness 
checks. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Stochastic Frontier Approach 
2.1 Background 
The stochastic frontier approach (SFA) was originally introduced in economics by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977). It was first 
applied on production functions to calculate technical efficiency. Frontier analysis provides a 
way to estimate the production function of a fully efficient firm, that is, the efficient production 
frontier. Green (1993) proposes that the “technical efficiency” of a given firm depends on the// 
relation between its observed production level and its fully efficient production level. A firm is 
said to be producing at maximum efficiency if its realized production is equal to its efficient 
production. In such a case, the firm’s actual output level lies on the efficient production frontier.  
However, if the firm’s actual output level lies below its efficient production frontier, then the 
firm is said to be technically inefficient. As a result, the firm’s technical efficiency is measured 
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by the ratio of its observed production to its fully efficient production. The estimation of the 
efficient production frontier involves the regression of the firm’s actual production on some 
explanatory variables that are expected to affect or determine the firm’s output level. 
Consequently, the error term is split into an inefficiency term and a random error term. In the 
same sense, stochastic frontier cost minimization models were introduced to examine the firm’s 
cost efficiency. 
Hofler and Payne (1997) apply SFA to examine the efficiency of National Basketball 
Association (NBA) teams. They study whether the performance of different NBA teams deviates 
from its optimal level and by how much. Anderson et al. (1999) use a cost minimization SFA to 
determine efficiency in the hotel industry. They show that, on average, the deviation from the 
optimal frontier efficiency level is approximately 11%. Altunbas et al. (2001) employ a 
stochastic frontier cost minimization analysis to measure the inefficiency in the European 
Banking sector. Trip et al. (2002) utilize the stochastic frontier methodology to suggest a direct 
relationship between the firm’s decision making quality and its efficiency.    
While the SFA has been rarely applied in the finance literature, there are a few notable 
exceptions. Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996) employ frontier analysis to reassess the issue 
of premarket IPO underpricing. Thus, they measure deliberate underpricing as the difference 
between the observed offer price and the maximized frontier price. Berger and Mester (1997) 
apply the stochastic frontier methodology, among other methods, to examine the sources of 
deviations in the efficiency of financial institutions. Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) utilize the 
stochastic frontier methodology to estimate agency costs. The authors produce an estimate of 
agency costs by comparing a firm’s observed value, as proxied by its actual Tobin’s Q, to the 
maximum value (Q*) of a hypothetical firm with identical features and characteristics. They find 
10 
 
that, on average, a firm’s actual Q deviates from Q* by approximately 16%. That is, on average, 
a firm’s actual market value is around $1,432,000 below its maximum achievable value. They 
show that this reduction in the value of the firm, or agency cost, is mainly related to managerial 
incentives. Depken et al. (2006) also use SFA to measure the firm’s agency cost. They examine 
how agency costs are affected by the firm’s external and internal environment.   
2.2 Efficient Compensation Benchmark 
In this paper, we investigate whether director compensation is efficient. To determine 
whether a certain level of compensation is efficient, it has to be compared to a benchmark. In 
general, director compensation varies across firms for several reasons, including: (i) the industry 
that the firm is operating in; (ii) the size of the firm; (iii) investment and growth opportunities of 
the firm; (iv) firm risk; (v) financial distress; (vi) firm performance; (vii) the soundness of the 
firm’s governance structure and monitoring environment. Therefore, we need to control for the 
firm’s opportunity set and characteristics in order to refrain from comparing the compensation of 
different directors, who possess dissimilar characteristics and attributes. Thus, to measure the 
efficiency of director compensation in a given firm, we compare the actual director 
compensation level in that firm to the optimal minimum compensation level in a hypothetical 
firm with the same characteristics and attributes.
3
 Consequently, we need to construct a frontier 
that represents the efficient compensation benchmark for any given set of firm characteristics 
and opportunities. Moreover, the efficient compensation frontier has to be stochastic. 
Specifically, the estimation of the efficient frontier has to account for measurement errors such 
                                                 
3
 We use the efficient compensation level of a hypothetical firm with the same opportunity set as a benchmark since 
the firm’s actual efficient director compensation level is not observable. 
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that it is not affected by luck or extreme values.
4
 Therefore, we utilize a stochastic frontier cost 
minimization approach to investigate the efficiency of director compensation. Accordingly, we 
estimate director excess compensation. A stochastic frontier function C* = f(X) is estimated by 
varying the firm characteristics and opportunity set (X). Thus, for any possible X, the efficient 
compensation frontier (C*) yields the minimum optimal compensation level that may be received 
by the firm’s director, after accounting for estimation error. 
A firm whose director’s actual compensation is above the frontier is said to provide its 
board member with a compensation level that is in excess to that of a director of a hypothetical 
efficient frontier firm with the same opportunity set and characteristics (X). Therefore, excess 
compensation may be represented by the difference between the observed compensation level 
(C) and the efficient compensation level (C*), attained by employing a stochastic frontier 
approach.  
2.3 Methodology 
In a cost minimization stochastic frontier analysis, actual compensation can never lie 
below the efficient compensation frontier (C*). That is, actual compensation may only be on the 
frontier or above it. The stochastic frontier approach allows for this phenomenon by splitting the 
traditional ordinary least squares error term into an unexplained or inefficiency term
5
 and a white 
                                                 
4
 Brick et al. (2006) measure excess compensation by comparing the actual compensation level to the predicted 
compensation level given firm, governance, and CEO characteristics. That is, expected compensation is employed as 
the benchmark compensation level. However, Brick et al. (2006) do not allow for statistical noise in their 
measurement of benchmark compensation. 
5
 The inefficiency term accounts for the nonnegative difference between actual and efficient compensation.  
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noise term.
6
 Therefore, let Cit = Xitβ + eit, where i = 1, 2,…,n refers to firm i and t = 1996, 1997, 
…, 2006 refers to year t. Cit is the realized total compensation. Xit is the set of explanatory 
variables hypothesized to predict the total compensation of directors. The compound error term 
eit is defined as eit = vit + uit. The bilaterally symmetrical white noise component vit ~ N(0, σ
2
v) is 
an iid random error term. vit allows the efficient compensation level to be stochastic by 
accounting for measurement error and, thus, the benchmark compensation level is not influenced 
by outliers. Consequently, our measure of excess compensation is not associated with estimation 
error or luck. The one-sided strictly non-negative inefficiency term uit is derived by truncation at 
zero of N(0, σ2u). We assume that the unexplained error component (uit) is an iid random variable 
with a half-normal distribution. Moreover, the two error components, vit and uit, are said to be 
independent of each other. In such a case, the spread between actual and efficient compensation 
is not associated with statistical noise. Furthermore, maximum likelihood estimation is employed 
to estimate the stochastic frontier model. 
  If director compensation in a given firm at a certain time is efficient, then uit = 0. That is, 
the director receives the minimum (efficient) level of compensation given the firm’s 
characteristics and opportunity set. Thus, the observed compensation level is equal to the 
efficient compensation level (C = C*). In such a case, the stochastic frontier model converges to 
an ordinary least squares model. However, if the board member is overpaid, then the inefficiency 
term is strictly greater than 0. Accordingly, actual compensation lies above the minimum 
compensation benchmark (C > C*).  
                                                 
6
 The white noise term allows for measurement error in the estimation of the efficient compensation frontier. 
13 
 
Consistent with the literature, we standardize our measure of excess compensation by 
estimating the firm’s technical efficiency. Technical efficiency, also referred to as predicted 
efficiency, is calculated as the ratio of actual compensation (C) to efficient compensation (C* ≡ 
C - u). That is, the technical efficiency of firm i at time t is given by the following formula:  
 
TEit = E(exp(Cit) \ uit, Xit) / E(exp(C*it) \ uit = 0, Xit)
7
 (Equation 1)  
 
Consequently, our measure of excess compensation lies between 1 and ∞.8 
To examine whether the observed compensation level is efficient, we utilize a likelihood 
ratio test. Given the firm’s characteristics and opportunity set, the actual compensation level is 
said to be efficient if the inefficiency term (uit) is equal to 0. That is, a director’s compensation is 
minimized only when he/she lies on the frontier. Therefore, we investigate whether, on average, 
u = 0. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, realized compensation is said to be efficient. As a 
result, the inefficiency term vanishes and, thus, the stochastic frontier model converges to an 
ordinary least squares model with a traditional error term. However, if excess compensation is 
present, then the inefficiency term exists. In such a case, we achieve a likelihood gain from using 
SFA instead of OLS.
9
 Consequently, the realized compensation level lies above the efficient 
                                                 
7
 We take the exponential of total compensation (exp(C)) since it enters our stochastic frontier model in logs.  
8
 Technical efficiency is never less than one since actual compensation is always greater or equal to efficient 
compensation. 
9
 Since the ordinary least squares model inappropriately assumes that σu = 0, we achieve a likelihood gain from 
using the stochastic frontier approach when C is strictly greater than C*. 
14 
 
compensation level. The deviation between the two compensation levels is represented by the 
one-sided error term. 
In addition, following Battese and Cora (1977), we define gamma (γ) as the ratio of the 
variance of the inefficiency term (σ2u) to the variance of the composite error term (σ
2
e). Thus, γ 
lies between 0 and 1. Consequently, γ helps examine how much of the variation in the error term 
(e) is explained by the variation in the inefficiency term (u). Moreover, γ provides an insight on 
whether the inefficiency term is different from 0 or not. That is, γ is approximately 0 when the 
compensation level is efficient.
10
 On the other hand, if γ is close to 1, then most of the variation 
in the composite error term (e) is characterized by the variation in the inefficiency term (u) and, 
thus, the compensation level is inefficient.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data and Variable Definitions 
The empirical analysis of the efficiency of director compensation, throughout the 1996-
2006 period, is based on data from the following databases: CRSP, Compustat, ExecuComp, and 
RiskMetrics.
11
 CRSP is used to acquire data regarding the firm’s daily stock prices and returns. 
Compustat provides data concerning the firm’s accounting and financial information. 
ExecuComp offers information pertaining to the top executives’ compensation, turnover, and 
                                                 
10
 The variance of the inefficiency term (σ2u) is almost 0 when compensation is efficient. 
11
 We start our sample period in 1996 since the RiskMetrics Directors dataset does not report data prior to 1996. The 
RiskMetrics Directors dataset is mainly used to acquire information regarding board size and board composition, 
which are expected to have a substantial influence on the board culture and the efficiency of internal monitoring. 
Furthermore, the fact that the ExecuComp database does not provide information concerning the number of board 
meetings after 2006 prevents us from calculating director total compensation for that period. 
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characteristics. RiskMetrics is employed to obtain information regarding the firm’s board 
characteristics and managerial entrenchment. To investigate the impact of SOX on the efficiency 
of director compensation, the whole sample period is divided into two sub-periods: 1996-2001 
and 2002-2006. 
Director total compensation is computed by the summation of cash compensation and the 
value of stock and option grants.  Director cash compensation is equal to the annual director 
retainer plus the multiplication of the director meeting fee and the number of board meetings. 
Similar to Brick et al. (2006), since the value of directors’ options is not given by ExecuComp, 
we use the per-option value of CEOs’ options to proxy for the per-option value of directors’ 
options.
12
  
We utilize the ExecuComp database to document CEO turnovers. A CEO turnover is 
identified if the CEO in year t+1 is different from the CEO in year t. Accordingly, we introduce a 
turnover dummy variable (Turnover) that takes the value of 1 if turnover is observed in a given 
year and 0 otherwise. 
We use the G-index and the E-index, developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et 
al. (2009) respectively, to proxy for CEO entrenchment. Gompers et al. (2003) present their G-
index based on 24 governance provisions to measure the soundness of the firm’s corporate 
governance. Each governance provision is assigned a value of 0 or 1, depending on whether it 
boosts managerial entrenchment or not. In other words, a value of 1 is assigned to each provision 
if it leads to a reduction in shareholder rights. Bebchuk et al. (2009) propose that the importance 
of the G-index is limited to six provisions captured by their E-index. 
                                                 
12
 Brick et al. (2006) apply this approach since proxy statements propose that the per-option values of CEOs’ and 
directors’ options are generally very much alike. 
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Risk-adjusted returns are computed to measure the firm’s performance. We use two 
measures of abnormal returns following the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model and the Carhart 
(1997) 4-factor model. Therefore, we collect daily returns from CRSP and employ either of the 
two models to estimate risk-adjusted returns. Specifically, for each firm i in a given year t, 
abnormal returns are represented by the intercept (αi) from the following regression models: 
 
rid – rfd = αi + β(rMd – rfd) + sSMBd + hHMLd  + εid    (Equation 2)        
rid – rfd = αi + β(rMd – rfd) + sSMBd + hHMLd + mMOMd  + εid         (Equation 3) 
 
where rid is the return of firm i in day d in a certain year. rfd is the simple daily T-bill rate. rMd- rfd, 
SMBd, HMLd and MOMd represent the market risk premium, size factor, book-to-market factor, 
and momentum factor, respectively. The daily data on these factors is obtained from Ken 
French’s website. 
In addition, we generally use the explanatory variables that were used by Brick et al. 
(2006) to predict director compensation. A detailed explanation of all the variables used in this 
paper is given in Table 1. We include industry and year dummy variables in all of our regression 
to control for unobserved industry and year specific characteristics. Industry is defined following 
the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. We employ White (1980) robust standard 
errors to control for possible heteroskedasticity.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on director total compensation and all other 
variables that are hypothesized to explain compensation. Specifically, we compute the mean and 
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standard deviation of these variables for the full sample period and the two sub-periods. During 
the entire sample period, the mean director total compensation is $85,914. The results highlight a 
substantial increase in director total compensation overtime. On average, the compensation that 
directors receive during the post-SOX period is approximately 55% higher than the amount that 
they obtain during the 1996-2001 period. 
4. Efficiency of Director Compensation 
In this section, we utilize a stochastic frontier approach to estimate director excess 
compensation. The natural logarithm of director total compensation is used as the dependent 
variable. As for the explanatory variables, we generally follow Brick et al. (2006) to account for 
CEO, governance, and firm characteristics. Table 3 presents the results of the stochastic frontier 
analysis employed to compute director excess compensation. In addition, we also present OLS 
regressions to compare the coefficient estimates between the two approaches. Table 3 shows 
that, in general, the coefficient estimates are very similar between the two approaches in terms of 
sign, magnitude, and significance.  
Consistent with Bryan et al. (2000) and Brick et al. (2006), we find that director total 
compensation is directly associated with the required levels of firm monitoring and the 
complexity of the directors’ job during the three sample periods: 1996-2001, 2002-2006, and 
1996-2006. That is, our results highlight the positive impact of firm sales, R&D expenditures, 
and volatility on director total compensation.
13
 Furthermore, we find that Tobin’s Q and capital 
expenditures are directly associated with director compensation. Bryan et al. (2000) and Linn 
                                                 
13
 Bryan et al. (2000) and Linn and Park (2005) use firm size, R&D expenditures, and firm volatility to proxy for the 
need for monitoring and the complexity of the directors’ job. 
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and Park (2005) propose that firms with higher investment and growth opportunities provide 
their board members with higher levels of compensation. In conformance with the findings of 
Brick et al. (2006), we highlight a negative relation between director total compensation and 
board size, percentage of inside directors, percentage of CEO equity, and PPE.  Moreover, 
consistent with Bryan et al. (2000), we find an inverse association between leverage and director 
compensation. Firm leverage, therefore, appears to serve as an alternative monitoring mechanism 
(Jensen, 1986; Williamson, 1988). We also document a positive relation between duality and 
director compensation. A CEO who also serves as the Chair of the board may exercise more 
power and control over the board of directors. These firms may require more monitoring and, 
thus, directors receive higher levels of compensation. On the other hand, the direct association 
between duality and director compensation may be a sign of a poor governance structure or 
“cronyism”. Furthermore, the firm’s accounting performance, as proxied by ROA, has a negative 
effect on director compensation. This may suggest that a firm with poor accounting performance 
might require higher levels of monitoring. As expected, we highlight a positive and significant 
relation between the number of board meetings and director compensation.
14
 That is, directors 
receive higher compensation as they meet more frequently.  
We employ a likelihood ratio test to investigate whether directors’ compensation is 
efficient or whether they are overpaid. That is, we test the null hypothesis that the inefficiency 
term is equal to zero. Our findings show that we can reject the null hypothesis in all three 
periods. Thus, on average, board members receive compensation that is significantly in excess of 
their efficient compensation level. While gamma equals 0.55 during the 1996-2001 period, it 
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 Note that the number of board meetings is used directly in the calculation of director compensation. 
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declines to 0.38 during the 2002-2006 period.  Therefore, during 1996-2001, 55% of the 
variation in the error term is explained by the variation in the inefficiency term. On the other 
hand, the variation in the inefficiency term explains only 38% of the variation in the composite 
error term during the 2002-2006 period.  
In addition, Table 3 presents the mean technical efficiency of director total compensation. 
As defined earlier, mean predicted u (as a percentage of C*) is equal to the ratio of director 
actual compensation (C) to director efficient compensation (C* = C - u). The results suggest that, 
on average, director actual compensation is around 163% of their efficient compensation during 
the full sample period. That is, on average, directors receive approximately $33,135 (63%) in 
excess of their benchmark compensation level.
15
 Also, note that the percentage of director excess 
compensation diminishes by around 36.5% between the 1996-2001 period and the 2002-2006 
period. Thus, although directors are still over compensated, they experience a reduction in their 
percentage of excessive compensation in the post-SOX period.  
5. Excess Compensation, Turnover, and Entrenchment 
5.1 Excess Compensation and Managerial Turnover 
In this section, we study the effect of director excess compensation on managerial 
turnover. The overpayment of board members might induce them to work harder and exert more 
monitoring effort. Therefore, the CEO may be under more pressure and scrutiny from the board. 
Thus, increased director compensation may enhance the efficacy and productiveness of internal 
                                                 
15
 The average excess compensation (in dollars) is calculated by subtracting the mean director efficient 
compensation from the mean director actual compensation. That is, Mean Excess Compensation (in dollars) = C(1-
(1/TE)).  
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monitoring. In such a case, we would expect a positive relation between director excess 
compensation and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Alternatively, the surplus in director 
compensation might be a sign of board entrenchment. In such a case, “cronyism” may take the 
form of increased job security for poor performing CEOs. Thus, director excess compensation 
may signal a failure on behalf of the board of directors to efficiently and effectively monitor the 
firm’s management. As a result, the overcompensation of directors may reduce the probability of 
managerial turnover.  
Table 4 employs a probit model in which CEO turnover (Turnover) at time t+1 is 
regressed on director excess compensation at time t. All of the explanatory variables that are 
hypothesized to predict director total compensation are used as control variables. The results 
document that director overcompensation has a negative and significant impact on the likelihood 
of CEO turnover during the full sample period and the 1996-2001 sub-period. Thus, the CEO 
gains additional job security and protection as directors receive higher excess compensation. The 
surplus in director compensation does not seem to enhance internal monitoring. However, during 
the post-SOX period, the negative relation between director excess compensation and CEO 
turnover is not significant.  
In addition, Table 4 documents that the likelihood of CEO turnover is directly related to 
firm volatility. Bushman, Dai, and Wang (2010) highlight a positive relation between CEO 
turnover and idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, we find that the prospect of CEO turnover rises as 
CEO age increases. The results also suggest a negative relation between managerial turnover and 
the percentage of CEO equity. The CEO’s power and control over the firm increases as his/her 
percentage equity ownership increases and, thus, the probability of CEO turnover declines.  
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5.2 Excess Compensation and Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
One might propose that the overpayment of board members induces them to exert more 
effort and, thus, improve the soundness of the firm’s governance structure. This leads to a 
reduction in agency problems as the CEO is more inclined to work in the shareholders’ best 
interests. As a consequence, the better alignment of interests between the owners of the firm and 
its management may lead to a reduction in the likelihood of managerial turnover. Therefore, the 
negative relation between director excess compensation and CEO turnover may be due to better 
governance. Therefore, we now explore whether the surplus in director compensation leads to 
the entrenchment of board members or whether it helps diminish agency problems by enhancing 
internal monitoring. 
Accordingly, while we find evidence on an inverse relation between director excess 
compensation and CEO replacement, we also consider whether director overcompensation is 
related to the turnover-performance sensitivity. If the surplus in director compensation signals 
the entrenchment of board members, we expect directors receiving high excess compensation to 
be more reluctant to dismiss the CEO due to poor performance than those receiving low excess 
compensation. On the other hand, if the overcompensation of directors is associated with 
enhanced and more efficient monitoring, highly overly compensated directors are more likely to 
remove the CEO on the basis of poor performance. 
During each of the three sample periods, an excess compensation dummy variable is 
defined to be equal to one if director excess compensation is higher than the median excess 
compensation during that period and zero otherwise. We use the firm’s abnormal return at time t 
to measure firm performance. Risk-adjusted returns are calculated using both the Fama-French 
(1993) 3-factor model and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model.  
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During all three sample periods, Table 5 columns 1, 5, and 9 highlight a negative relation 
between the director excess compensation dummy and CEO turnover. Therefore, consistent with 
our previous findings (Table 4), directors earning high excess compensation are less likely to 
terminate the CEO’s contract than directors earning low excess compensation. Moreover, in line 
with the existing literature, our results document an inverse relation between the firm’s abnormal 
returns, computed based on the Fama-French 3-factor model, and managerial turnover. A 
reduction in the firm’s performance increases the possibility of CEO removal. We obtain 
analogous results when calculating abnormal returns based on Carhart’s 4-factor model.  
In addition, we introduce an interaction variable between the director excess 
compensation dummy and the firm’s risk-adjusted returns in order to investigate the impact of 
director excess compensation on the turnover-performance sensitivity. During 1996-2006, 
columns 2 and 4 show that although the relation between director excess compensation and CEO 
turnover is negative, but it is no longer significant. The coefficient estimate for the firm’s 
abnormal returns is negative and significant indicating that a reduction in the firm’s performance 
increases the probability of CEO turnover when directors receive low excess compensation. 
Furthermore, we show that the interaction variable is positive and significant using both 
measures of firm performance. Therefore, the CEO is less likely to be dismissed due to poor firm 
performance when board members are highly over compensated. This suggests that the surplus in 
director compensation leads to poor monitoring by the board and is consistent with excess 
compensation facilitating board entrenchment. The entrenchment of the board members provides 
the CEO with increased protection and job security. Although we obtain similar findings during 
the 1996-2001 and 2002-2006 subsamples, the interaction variable is insignificant.  
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5.3 Excess Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment 
Since our findings suggest that director excess compensation is directly associated with 
the CEO’s job security, this may suggest a positive relation between managerial entrenchment 
and directors overpayment. Therefore, we investigate the impact of the surplus in director 
compensation on CEO entrenchment. Both the G-Index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and 
the E-Index presented by Bebchuk et al. (2009) are utilized to measure managerial entrenchment.  
Table 6 presents the regression of managerial entrenchment at time t+1 on director excess 
compensation at time t. We use all the variables that were previously employed to predict 
director total compensation as control variables. In general, the results suggest a positive 
association between director overcompensation and managerial entrenchment. Thus, shareholder 
rights decrease as directors receive additional excess compensation. However, the relation 
between director excessive compensation and managerial entrenchment (as proxied by the E-
index or G-index) is not significant during the post-SOX period.  The passage of SOX, which 
may have led to the reduction in the mean technical efficiency of director total compensation, 
may have helped reduce the direct effect of director excess compensation on board entrenchment 
and the lack of monitoring. 
Table 6 also shows many control variables are significant with the expected sign. For 
example, managerial entrenchment is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. Thus, managers are 
generally more entrenched in firms with low investment opportunities. Moreover, managerial 
entrenchment is adversely affected by firm size, as proxied by the natural logarithm of sales. 
Therefore, the managers of smaller firms tend to be more entrenched. Firm leverage seems to 
have a positive impact on CEO entrenchment. Thus, highly entrenched managers seem to borrow 
more. In general, the manager’s authority in a given firm is expected to increase when he/she 
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gets older. Unpredictably, the results highlight a negative relation between entrenchment and the 
age of the CEO. Furthermore, we highlight a positive relation between board size and managerial 
entrenchment. Several articles propose that large boards of directors are not successful in 
efficiently and effectively monitoring the firm’s management (e.g. Yermack, 1996). In addition, 
the manager is more entrenched when he/she also serves as the chair of the board.  
Again, our findings propose that director excess compensation signals the presence of 
collusion and back-scratching between the manager and the board members. Therefore, we 
provide evidence on the presence of other forms of “cronyism” between the CEO and the 
directors. That is, this paper finds that the surplus in director compensation is directly associated 
with CEO immunity and entrenchment. 
6. Impact of Excess Compensation on Future Firm Performance  
The surplus in director compensation may also have an adverse effect on the firm’s future 
performance. Therefore, we next investigate the relation between director excess compensation 
and the firm’s future risk-adjusted returns. We measure abnormal returns following both the 
Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. All explanatory 
variables used to estimate director excess compensation are included as control variables. 
The results presented in Table 7 show that the coefficient estimates for director excess 
compensation is negative but insignificant in all three sample periods, using both measures of 
future firm performance. Thus, an increase in director overcompensation does not directly imply 
a significant reduction in the firm’s future abnormal returns.  
However, we also explore whether the surplus in director compensation has an indirect 
effect on the firm’s future performance through its effect on CEO entrenchment. Specifically, we 
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examine the impact of director excess compensation on the relationship between managerial 
entrenchment and future firm performance.
16
 Since we hypothesize that director 
overcompensation signals the entrenchment of board members, we study how firm performance 
is affected when both the CEO and the directors are entrenched.  
In Table 8, we use the Fama-French abnormal returns at time t+1 as the dependent 
variable. We introduce an interaction variable between the director excess compensation dummy 
and CEO entrenchment in order to investigate how the entrenchment-performance relation is 
affected by director overcompensation. Again, managerial entrenchment is proxied by either the 
E-index or the G-index.  
During 1996-2006, column 1 shows that the coefficient estimates for both the director 
excess compensation dummy and the E-index are insignificant. Using the G-index, column 3 
reports similar results. Columns 2 and 4 report the regression results when the interaction 
variable between director excess compensation and managerial entrenchment is included. In both 
cases, the results suggest that the coefficient estimates for the excess compensation dummy 
variable is positive and significant. Therefore, when the manager is not entrenched, the surplus in 
director compensation seems to induce directors to exert more effort and, thus, improve the 
firm’s performance. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for managerial entrenchment is positive 
when directors receive low excess compensation. Columns 2 and 4 show that the coefficient 
estimates for the interaction variable are negative and significant. That is, we observe a 
significant negative change in the relationship between managerial entrenchment and future firm 
performance when board members receive high excess compensation. Therefore, our findings 
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 Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) propose that firm performance is adversely affected by 
managerial entrenchment. 
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suggest that it is the entrenchment combination of both the CEO and the directors that leads to a 
reduction in the firm’s performance. Actually, there may be an improvement in firm performance 
if only one of the two parties is entrenched. In such a case, we suggest that director overpayment 
has an indirect adverse impact on future firm performance through its effect on the 
entrenchment-performance relationship. 
In general, the results are similar for the 1996-2001 period. However, column 9 shows 
that the coefficient estimate for the E-index is negative and significant when the interaction 
variable is not included. During the post-SOX period, the findings are inconsistent with those of 
the 1996-2001 and 1996-2006 periods. We show that managerial entrenchment, using both the 
E-index and the G-index, is positively and significantly related to future firm performance. This 
result holds whether or not the interaction variable is included. These results are in line with the 
findings of Bhagat and Bolton (2010), who highlight a change in the relationship between the 
governance indices and firm performance in the post-SOX period. They show that although the 
relation between the governance indices and firm performance is negative in the pre-SOX period, 
an increase in the G-index has a positive effect on firm performance following the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Moreover, in the post-SOX period, Bhagat and 
Bolton (2010) suggest that the relation between the E-index and firm performance is 
inconsistent. In addition, although our results show that the coefficient estimate for the 
interaction variable is negative, it is not significant. This is in accordance with our previous 
suggestion that the post-SOX era provides an environment whereby the surplus in director 
compensation is not significantly associated with board entrenchment and poor monitoring. 
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7. Robustness Checks 
Brick et al. (2006) examine the CEO and director excess compensation for the 1992-2001 
period. Therefore, in unreported results, we also investigate the efficiency of director 
compensation for that same time period.
17
 The results are generally equivalent to those 
documented for the 1996-2001 period. Specifically, we confirm the inefficiency of director 
compensation and the positive association between director overcompensation and board 
entrenchment.  
Furthermore, we repeat all of our empirical analyses using the Brick et al. (2006) measure 
of excess compensation. That is, we define excess compensation as the residual in an ordinary 
least squares regression of total compensation on the variables hypothesized to explain total 
compensation. Except for the analysis of the efficiency of total compensation, the results 
obtained using the Brick et al. (2006) methodology are generally similar to those obtained by 
employing the stochastic frontier approach. That is, in general, the coefficient estimates are 
similar for both methodologies in terms of sign and significance. However, we find that 
measuring excess compensation following the Brick et al. (2006) approach yields biased 
coefficient estimates. 
In addition, we examine how the entrenchment-performance relation is affected by 
director overcompensation when the firm’s risk-adjusted returns are computed following 
Carhart’s 4-factor model. The results are almost identical to those reported in table 9. 
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 In order to perform our stochastic frontier analysis for the 1992-2001 period, we drop both board size and the 
percentage of independent directors from our list of control variables since the RiskMetrics database does not report 
data prior to 1996. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper applies a stochastic cost frontier analysis to examine the efficiency of director 
compensation. Allowing for statistical noise, the frontier exemplifies the optimal level of 
compensation provided to the directors of the firm, given the firm’s opportunity set and 
characteristics. Therefore, we measure excess compensation by comparing the actual 
compensation level to the efficient compensation benchmark.  
Our findings highlight a substantial inefficiency in the total compensation of directors. 
On average, during 1996-2006, directors are overpaid by approximately 63% relative to their 
benchmark compensation. That is, the mean director total compensation is around $33,135 in 
surplus of the efficient compensation level. Consequently, we explore the impact of director 
excess compensation on the soundness of the firm’s governance structure and performance. 
We show that an increase in director overcompensation reduces the likelihood of 
managerial turnover. The results also indicate that the manager is less likely to be dismissed due 
to poor performance when board members are highly overcompensated. Moreover, our findings 
suggest that an increase in director excess compensation amplifies managerial entrenchment. 
Therefore, our results suggest that overpaying the board members helps the CEO gain additional 
job protection and increases his/her authority and control over the board. Accordingly, the 
excessive compensation of directors seems to be a sign of board entrenchment.  
This paper suggests that the surplus in director compensation has an indirect effect on the 
firm’s future performance. We find a significant negative change in the relationship between 
managerial entrenchment and the firm’s future abnormal returns when the directors of that firm 
receive high excess compensation. In other words, managerial entrenchment has an adverse 
effect on future performance only when board members are highly overcompensated. 
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Overall, this article implies that overly compensating directors has a converse impact on 
the soundness of the firm’s governance structure by promoting a board environment that is 
predicated by some sort of collusion and mutual back-scratching between the CEO and the 
directors. Our study complements the work of Brick et al. (2006) by suggesting the presence of a 
different type of “cronyism” between board members and the CEO. Specifically, we show that 
the surplus in director compensation is positively associated with managerial job security and 
entrenchment. Finally, it is interesting to note that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may 
have enhanced the board culture by diminishing the significance of director excess compensation 
as a sign of socialization and board entrenchment. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable Definition 
Director Total 
Compensation 
Director total compensation is computed by the summation of cash compensation and the value of stock and option grants.  
Director cash compensation is equal to the annual director retainer plus the multiplication of the director meeting fee and the 
number of board meetings. Similar to Brick et al. (2006), since the value of directors’ options is not given by ExecuComp, we 
use the per-option value of the CEOs’ options to proxy for the per-option value of the directors’ options.  The natural 
logarithm of Director total compensation is used. 
 
CEO Total Compensation CEO total compensation is calculated by adding the CEO’s salary, bonus, the Black-Scholes value of options granted, the 
value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts, other annual and all other total compensation.  The natural 
logarithm of CEO total compensation is used. 
 
Qt-1 The one period lagged Tobin's Q is computed following Chung & Pruitt (1994). It is equal to the sum of the Market Value of 
Equity, liquidating value of Preferred Stock, and Debt divided by the book value of Total Assets.  The natural logarithm of 
Tobin’s Q is used. 
 
ROA t-1 The one period lagged Return on Assets. It computed by taking the ratio of EBITDA to Total Assets.  The natural logarithm 
of volatility is ROA. 
 
Volatility The Black-Scholes volatility measure.  The natural logarithm of volatility is used. 
 
Salest-1 The one period lagged firm sales. The natural logarithm of sales is used.  
Employeest-1 The one period lagged number of employees in a given firm. The natural logarithm of the number of employees is used. 
 
R&Dt-1/Att-1 The one period lagged ratio of research and development expenses to total assets. 
Advt-1/Att-1 The one period lagged ratio of advertisement expenses to total assets. 
Leveraget-1 The one period lagged long term Debt. The natural logarithm of leverage is used. 
PPEt-1/Att-1 The one period lagged ratio of property, plant, and equipment to Total Assets.   
 
Capxt-1 The one period lagged capital expenditures. The natural logarithm of capital expenditures is used. 
 
Age The CEO’s age. The natural logarithm of the CEO’s age is used. 
Percentage CEO Equity The percentage of the firm’s equity that is held by the CEO. 
Percentage Inside The percentage of board members who are insiders. 
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Variable Variable Definition 
Board Size The total number of board members. 
Gender Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise. 
Duality Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
Board Meetings 
 
The natural logarithm of the number of board meetings is used. 
Internal CEO Internal CEO is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO had been employed by the firm for more than one year before he/she 
became a CEO and 0 otherwise. 
Turnover A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO turnover is documented in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
E-Index E-Index is the entrenchment index presented by Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
 
G-Index G-Index is the governance index presented by Gompers et al. (2003). 
Abnormal Return FF The firm’s abnormal return measured following Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model. 
Abnormal Return Carhart The firm’s abnormal return measured following Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. 
32 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  1996-2001 2002-2006 1996-2006 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Director Total Compensation 69,931.25 114,882.20 108,677.60 418,725.60 85,914.53 283,614.60 
CEO Total Compensation 4,936,441 14,560,350 5,089,621 7,145,256 5,006,600 11,759,480 
Qt-1 1.8906 3.6161 1.4110 1.4536 1.6484 2.7563 
ROA t-1 0.1334 0.1378 0.1134 0.1750 0.1234 0.1579 
Volatility 0.4197 0.2209 0.4799 0.3264 0.4486 0.2783 
Salest-1 (in Thousands) 3,964,757 10,693,870 5,140,071 15,051,610 4,562,884 13,106,830 
Employeest-1 18,020.46 47,892.94 19,680.19 57,979.18 18,797.26 52,858.71 
R&Dt-1/Att-1 0.0322 0.0790 0.0301 0.1142 0.0311 0.0984 
Advt-1/Att-1 0.0114 0.0389 0.0115 0.0337 0.0114 0.0363 
Leveraget-1 (in Thousands) 2,058,481 13,433,800 1,549,342 8,945,899 2,549,565 16,639,520 
PPEt-1/Att-1 0.2986 0.2371 0.2550 0.2259 0.2768 0.2326 
Capxt-1 (in Thousands) 284,674.3 1,101,771 285,577 1,145,070 283,831.7 1,059,835 
Age 55.5763 7.8472 55.8419 7.6420 55.6982 7.7546 
Percentage CEO Equity 0.0306 0.0699 0.0346 0.8581 0.0325 0.5821 
Percentage Inside 22.3054 12.3309 18.4179 9.7453 20.5042 11.3734 
Board Size 9.8086 3.1690 9.3930 2.5725 9.6161 2.9151 
Gender Dummy 0.0115 0.1068 0.0209 0.1432 0.0159 0.1249 
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  1996-2001 2002-2006 1996-2006 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Duality 0.7080 0.4547 0.5754 0.4943 0.6470 0.4779 
Number of Board Meetings 7.2488 3.1647 7.6572 3.6279 7.4168 3.3689 
Internal CEO 0.7445 0.4361 0.6343 0.4817 0.6949 0.4604 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on Director Total Compensation, CEO Total Compensation, and the variables that are hypothesized to predict 
compensation. Specifically, this table provides the mean and standard deviation of these variables during the whole sample period (1996-2006), in addition 
to the 2 sub-periods (1996-2001 and 2002-2006).  
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Table 3. Director Efficient Compensation Frontier 
Log (Director Total Compensation) Least Squares Stochastic Frontier Approach 
  1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
          Log (Qt-1) 0.2529*** 0.2715*** 0.2148*** 0.2343*** 0.2436*** 0.2056*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0225) (0.0230) (0.0130) (0.0171) (0.0204) 
          Log (ROAt-1) -0.0606*** -0.0969*** -0.0399* -0.0544*** -0.0848*** -0.0379* 
  (0.0187) (0.0304) (0.0234) (0.0146) (0.0223) (0.0199) 
          Log (Volatility) 0.1866*** 0.2153*** 0.1462*** 0.1672*** 0.1730*** 0.1390*** 
  (0.0238) (0.0359) (0.0325) (0.0233) (0.0364) (0.0311) 
          Log (Salest-1) 0.2326*** 0.2181*** 0.2468*** 0.2309*** 0.2123*** 0.2479*** 
  (0.0151) (0.0218) (0.0208) (0.0137) (0.0189) (0.0199) 
          Log (Employeest-1) -0.0739*** -0.0594*** -0.0925*** -0.0705*** -0.0520*** -0.0914*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0196) (0.0184) (0.0122) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
          R&Dt-1/At t-1 1.2729*** 1.2758*** 1.3288*** 1.3155*** 1.3251*** 1.3578*** 
  (0.2635) (0.3566) (0.3975) (0.2139) (0.2639) (0.3598) 
          Advt-1/At t-1 -0.3852 -0.5674 0.0813 -0.2913 -0.402 0.1158 
  (0.2574) (0.3611) (0.3733) (0.2806) (0.3819) (0.4275) 
          Log (Leveraget-1) -0.0098* -0.0152* -0.0049 -0.0088* -0.0142** -0.0045 
  (0.0058) (0.0087) (0.0078) (0.0049) (0.0072) (0.0068) 
          PPEt-1/Att-1 -0.3863*** -0.2784*** -0.5054*** -0.3717*** -0.2506*** -0.5008*** 
  (0.0558) (0.0756) (0.0849) (0.0515) (0.0689) (0.0772) 
          Log (Capxt-1) 0.0383*** 0.0356*** 0.0431*** 0.0384*** 0.0362*** 0.0428*** 
  (0.0070) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0085) 
          Log (AGE) -0.2184*** -0.1238 -0.3179*** -0.2232*** -0.1326* -0.3235*** 
  (0.0591) (0.0791) (0.0883) (0.0529) (0.0725) (0.0779) 
          Percentage CEO Equity -1.7616*** -1.8482*** -1.6920*** -1.8647*** -1.9586*** -1.7682*** 
  (0.1962) (0.2167) (0.3410) (0.1270) (0.1662) (0.1962) 
          Percentage Inside -0.0024*** -0.0017** -0.0037*** -0.0026*** -0.0020*** -0.0038*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
          Board Size -0.0092*** -0.0031 -0.0153*** -0.0071** -0.0015 -0.0132** 
  (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0053) 
          Gender Dummy 0.1392** 0.2183* 0.0749 0.1451** 0.2113** 0.0849 
  (0.0648) (0.1243) (0.0636) (0.0660) (0.1018) (0.0864) 
          Duality 0.0507*** 0.0685*** 0.0319 0.0484*** 0.0703*** 0.0287 
  (0.0165) (0.0238) (0.0232) (0.0158) (0.0225) (0.0222) 
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Log (Director Total Compensation) Least Squares Stochastic Frontier Approach 
          Log (Number of Board Meetings) 0.2246*** 0.2340*** 0.2088*** 0.2320*** 0.2508*** 0.2112*** 
  (0.0214) (0.0298) (0.0307) (0.0196) (0.0271) (0.0283) 
          Internal CEO -0.0179 -0.0211 -0.0128 -0.0124 -0.0114 -0.0099 
  (0.0171) (0.0258) (0.0227) (0.0159) (0.0230) (0.0218) 
          Intercept 3.0364*** 2.3709*** 3.7297*** 2.8769*** 1.9829*** 3.4593*** 
  (0.2781) (0.3892) (0.4016) (0.2656) (0.3629) (0.3785) 
          Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Adj. R-Sq 0.2663 0.2684 0.2724 
  
  
          Likelihood-ratio test of u=0 
  
  35.04*** 24.70*** 11.01*** 
          Mean predicted u (as % of C*) 
  
  162.78%   181.16% 144.62% 
               
  0.5694 0.5428 0.5861 
               
  0.5366 0.6037 0.4578 
            
  
  0.6122 0.659 0.5531 
            
  
  0.4703 0.553 0.3789 
          Number of Observations 8944 4759 4185 8944 4759 4185 
 
Table 3 presents the stochastic frontier estimation of Director efficient compensation during the whole sample period (1996-2006), in addition to the 2 sub-
periods (1996-2001 and 2002-2006). Moreover, we also report the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is Director Total 
Compensation. Industry and year dummies are included to control for industry and year specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and 
French 48-industry definition. Table 1 provides detailed information on all variables. In our OLS regression, we compute robust standard errors following 
White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity.  We employ a likelihood ratio test to investigate the efficiency of director compensation. The 
mean predicted u (as a percentage of C*) is equal to the ratio of directors’ actual compensation (C) to directors’ efficient compensation (C* = C - u). 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Director Excess Compensation and CEO Turnover 
Turnover t+1 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
  
  
  
Director Excess Compensation t -0.2854*** -0.2683*** -0.2070 
  (0.0605) (0.0588) (0.1327) 
      Log (Qt-1) -0.0065 -0.0466 0.0453 
  (0.0318) (0.0417) (0.0517) 
      Log (ROAt-1) -0.0072 0.0530 -0.0685 
  (0.0365) (0.0575) (0.0503) 
      Log (Volatility) 0.2008*** 0.3498*** 0.0970 
  (0.0539) (0.0802) (0.0782) 
      Log (Salest-1) 0.0191 0.0512 0.0201 
  (0.0360) (0.0507) (0.0536) 
      Log (Employeest-1) -0.0204 -0.0736 0.0172 
  (0.0319) (0.0453) (0.0466) 
      R&Dt-1/At t-1 0.2310 -0.4564 1.0099 
  (0.5726) (0.7749) (0.9695) 
      Advt-1/At t-1 1.2433* 0.8062 1.8563* 
  (0.7027) (0.9621) (1.1045) 
      Log (Leveraget-1) -0.0270** -0.0176 -0.0372** 
  (0.0125) (0.0185) (0.0175) 
      PPEt-1/Att-1 0.0392 -0.0364 0.1138 
  (0.1336) (0.1795) (0.2067) 
      Log (Capxt-1) 0.0502*** 0.0610*** 0.0334 
  (0.0158) (0.0220) (0.0237) 
      Log (AGE) 1.3595*** 1.3504*** 1.3941*** 
  (0.1403) (0.1916) (0.2132) 
      Percentage CEO Equity -0.5860* -0.6359 -0.5155 
  (0.3452) (0.4627) (0.5348) 
      Percentage Inside 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0031 
  (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
      Board Size 0.0091 0.0114 0.0044 
  (0.0087) (0.0114) (0.0140) 
      Gender Dummy -0.2230 -0.6876* 0.0022 
  (0.1913) (0.3660) (0.2320) 
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Turnover t+1 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
Duality -0.0462 -0.1161** 0.0142 
  (0.0402) (0.0574) (0.0585) 
      Log (Number of Board Meetings) 0.4927*** 0.5446*** 0.4593*** 
  (0.0495) (0.0679) (0.0749) 
      Internal CEO 0.4741*** 0.4461*** 0.4910*** 
  (0.0450) (0.0653) (0.0636) 
      Intercept -8.3935*** -7.7766*** -13.2081 
  (0.7838) (1.0100) (0.9739) 
      Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      Pseudo R-Sq 0.067 0.0802 0.0709 
      Number of Observations 8570 4523 4028 
 
Table 4 employs a probit model to investigate the impact of director excess compensation on CEO turnover during the whole sample period (1996-2006), in 
addition to the 2 sub-periods (1996-2001 and 2002-2006). The dependent variable is CEO turnover at time t+1. Director excess compensation is measured by 
utilizing a stochastic frontier approach. We include all the variables that were hypothesized to explain director total compensation as control variables. 
Industry and year dummies are included to control for industry and year specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French 48-industry 
definition. Table 1 provides detailed information on all variables. Robust standard errors are computed following White (1980) to account for any possible 
heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Director Excess Compensation and CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
Turnovert+1 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Excess Dummyt 
-
0.2085*** 
-0.0709 
-
0.2084*** 
-0.064 
-
0.2819*** 
-0.2553 
-
0.2817*** 
-0.2738 -0.1452*** -0.1251 -0.1451*** -0.1076 
  (0.0366) (0.0816) (0.0366) (0.0822) (0.0504) (0.3127) (0.0504) (0.3215) (0.0542) (0.1106) (0.0542) (0.1112) 
                 
Abnormal Return FFt 
-
0.1024*** 
-
0.1488***  
  
-
0.3355*** 
-
0.3419***  
  -0.0856 -0.0988 
 
  
  (0.0287) (0.0379) 
 
  (0.0840) (0.1119) 
 
  (0.0715) (0.0956) 
 
  
                 Excess Dummyt * Abnormal Return FFt  
0.1024* 
 
  
 
0.0141 
 
  
 
0.028 
 
  
  
 
(0.0543) 
 
  
 
(0.1643) 
 
  
 
(0.1341) 
 
  
                 
Abnormal Return Carhartt   
-
0.1041*** 
-
0.1532***   
-
0.3524*** 
-
0.3543***   
-0.087 -0.1116 
  
  
(0.0291) (0.0384) 
  
(0.0868) (0.1153) 
  
(0.0717) (0.0958) 
                 Excess Dummyt * Abnormal Return 
Carhartt     
0.1079** 
   
0.0042 
   
0.0519 
  
   
(0.0550) 
   
(0.1700) 
   
(0.1345) 
                 Log (Qt-1) 0.0016 0.003 0.0018 0.0032 -0.0412 -0.0413 -0.0417 -0.0417 0.0375 0.0375 0.0379 0.0379 
  (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0523) 
                 Log (ROAt-1) -0.0277 -0.0277 -0.0278 -0.0279 0.0474 0.0475 0.0487 0.0488 -0.0654 -0.065 -0.0656 -0.0649 
  (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0519) (0.0520) 
                 Log (Volatility) 0.2391*** 0.2381*** 0.2401*** 0.2390*** 0.3842*** 0.3840*** 0.3888*** 0.3888*** 0.1198 0.1191 0.1204 0.1192 
  (0.0561) (0.0561) (0.0561) (0.0562) (0.0827) (0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0828) (0.0824) (0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0825) 
                 Log (Salest-1) 0.0223 0.0218 0.0224 0.0219 0.0455 0.0454 0.0456 0.0456 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0015 
  (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0548) 
                 Log (Employeest-1) -0.0209 -0.0207 -0.021 -0.0208 -0.0736 -0.0735 -0.0737 -0.0737 0.0266 0.0266 0.0266 0.0265 
  (0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0468) (0.0469) (0.0469) (0.0469) (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0475) 
                 R&Dt-1/ATt-1 -0.0217 0.0009 -0.0231 -0.0012 -0.4354 -0.4329 -0.4431 -0.4424 0.7914 0.7928 0.7962 0.7988 
  (0.5893) (0.5877) (0.5896) (0.5880) (0.7783) (0.7788) (0.7805) (0.7810) (0.9961) (0.9961) (0.9961) (0.9960) 
                 R&Dt-1/ATt-1 1.1138 1.1133 1.1133 1.1127 1.0074 1.009 1.0122 1.0127 1.7416 1.7478 1.742 1.7542 
  (0.7068) (0.7060) (0.7067) (0.7059) (0.9605) (0.9607) (0.9605) (0.9607) (1.1208) (1.1213) (1.1206) (1.1214) 
                 Log (Leveraget-1) -0.0265** -0.0260** -0.0264** -0.0260** -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.0407** -0.0407** -0.0408** -0.0407** 
  (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
                 PPEt-1/ATt-1 0.0089 0.0094 0.009 0.0094 -0.0218 -0.022 -0.0194 -0.0194 0.0765 0.0756 0.0762 0.0746 
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Turnovert+1 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
  (0.1368) (0.1369) (0.1368) (0.1369) (0.1845) (0.1845) (0.1845) (0.1845) (0.2116) (0.2117) (0.2116) (0.2116) 
                 Log (Capxt-1) 0.0501*** 0.0500*** 0.0502*** 0.0500*** 0.0560** 0.0560** 0.0557** 0.0557** 0.0460* 0.0461* 0.0461* 0.0462* 
  (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0245) 
                 Log (AGE) 1.3249*** 1.3267*** 1.3245*** 1.3266*** 1.2216*** 1.2220*** 1.2225*** 1.2226*** 1.4390*** 1.4386*** 1.4377*** 1.4371*** 
  (0.1419) (0.1419) (0.1419) (0.1419) (0.1946) (0.1946) (0.1946) (0.1947) (0.2153) (0.2153) (0.2153) (0.2153) 
                 Percentage CEO Equity -0.6338* -0.6362* -0.6348* -0.6375* -0.8116 -0.8109 -0.8158* -0.8156* -0.3662 -0.3635 -0.3664 -0.3613 
  (0.3567) (0.3567) (0.3567) (0.3567) (0.4951) (0.4952) (0.4951) (0.4952) (0.5294) (0.5296) (0.5293) (0.5296) 
                 Percentage Inside 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 
  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
                 Board Size 0.0094 0.0095 0.0094 0.0095 0.0167 0.0167 0.0168 0.0168 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 
  (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) 
                 Gender Dummy -0.1627 -0.1592 -0.163 -0.1594 -0.6173* -0.6168* -0.6186* -0.6185* 0.0234 0.0252 0.0232 0.0266 
  (0.1917) (0.1919) (0.1917) (0.1919) (0.3724) (0.3724) (0.3729) (0.3729) (0.2314) (0.2314) (0.2314) (0.2313) 
                 Duality -0.0538 -0.0532 -0.0536 -0.053 -0.1022* -0.1023* -0.1014* -0.1014* 0.009 0.0091 0.0093 0.0095 
  (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0594) (0.0594) (0.0594) (0.0594) 
                 Log (Number of Board Meetings) 0.4694*** 0.4711*** 0.4695*** 0.4713*** 0.4942*** 0.4943*** 0.4934*** 0.4934*** 0.4390*** 0.4391*** 0.4390*** 0.4392*** 
  (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0764) 
                 Internal CEO 0.4670*** 0.4667*** 0.4671*** 0.4668*** 0.4562*** 0.4561*** 0.4563*** 0.4562*** 0.4897*** 0.4899*** 0.4898*** 0.4902*** 
  (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0641) (0.0641) (0.0641) (0.0641) 
                 
Intercept 
-
8.7007*** 
-
8.7771*** 
-
8.7013*** 
-
8.7825*** 
-
8.1396*** 
-
8.1529*** 
-
8.1665*** 
-
8.1705*** 
-
13.5187*** 
-
13.5304*** 
-
13.5165*** 
-
13.539*** 
  (0.7892) (0.7904) (0.7892) (0.7904) (1.0315) (1.0428) (1.0318) (1.0438) (0.9872) (0.9927) (0.9883) (0.9935) 
                 Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 Pseudo R-Sq 0.0698 0.0703 0.0698 0.0704 0.0859 0.0859 0.086 0.086 0.0738 0.0738 0.0738 0.0738 
                 Number of Observations 8386 8386 8386 8386 4390 4390 4390 4390 3977 3977 3977 3977 
 
Table 5 employs a probit model to investigate the impact of director excess compensation on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity during the whole sample period (1996-2006), in addition to the 2 sub-periods 
(1996-2001 and 2002-2006). The dependent variable is CEO turnover at time t+1. During each sample period, an excess compensation dummy variable is defined to be equal to 1 if director excess compensation is 
greater than the mean excess compensation during that period and 0 otherwise. To measure firm performance, we calculate the firm’s abnormal return at time t following both the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model 
and Carhart (1997) 4-factor model.    We include all the variables that were hypothesized to explain director total compensation as control variables. Industry and year dummies are included to control for industry 
and year specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French 48-industry definition. Table 1 provides detailed information on all variables. Robust standard errors are computed following White 
(1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Director Excess Compensation and CEO Entrenchment 
  E-Indext+1 G-Indext+1 
  1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
  
  
  
  
  
Director Excess Compensation 0.1173** 0.1165*** 0.1654 0.0012 0.0198 -0.0207 
  (0.0526) (0.0383) (0.1155) (0.0660) (0.0773) (0.1343) 
          Log (Qt-1) -0.1961*** -0.2286*** -0.1592*** -0.2708*** -0.3277*** -0.1902** 
  (0.0257) (0.0336) (0.0404) (0.0505) (0.0656) (0.0810) 
          Log (ROAt-1) 0.1232*** 0.1496*** 0.1072*** 0.1690*** 0.1609* 0.1743** 
  (0.0302) (0.0472) (0.0404) (0.0595) (0.0929) (0.0811) 
          Log (Volatility) -0.0773 -0.0422 -0.1145 -0.9035*** -0.9495*** -0.7969*** 
  (0.0507) (0.0728) (0.0717) (0.0972) (0.1472) (0.1315) 
          Log (Salest-1) -0.1743*** -0.1952*** -0.1633*** -0.3699*** -0.3703*** -0.3791*** 
  (0.0292) (0.0407) (0.0425) (0.0570) (0.0801) (0.0815) 
          Log (Employeest-1) 0.0719*** 0.1234*** 0.0273 0.3763*** 0.4337*** 0.3545*** 
  (0.0254) (0.0366) (0.0360) (0.0494) (0.0696) (0.0712) 
          R&Dt-1/At t-1 -0.0370 -0.2879 0.6393 -0.7322 -1.6942 0.2494 
  (0.4298) (0.5958) (0.6459) (0.8653) (1.2208) (1.2960) 
          Advt-1/At t-1 -0.3882 -0.1778 -1.4392 0.0254 0.7092 -3.2282** 
  (0.5523) (0.7208) (0.9688) (1.0357) (1.4115) (1.4570) 
          Log (Leveraget-1) 0.0392*** 0.0564*** 0.0262** 0.1139*** 0.0953*** 0.1350*** 
  (0.0096) (0.0141) (0.0132) (0.0190) (0.0286) (0.0258) 
          PPEt-1/Att-1 0.2387** 0.3254** 0.1606 0.0350 0.0324 0.0505 
  (0.1109) (0.1510) (0.1652) (0.2067) (0.2844) (0.3022) 
          Log (Capxt-1) -0.0212 -0.0407** -0.0053 -0.0774*** -0.0509 -0.1295*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0183) (0.0211) (0.0278) (0.0381) (0.0412) 
          Log (AGE) -0.3647*** -0.2635* -0.6004*** -0.4002* -0.0170 -1.0788*** 
  (0.1100) (0.1543) (0.1606) (0.2087) (0.3004) (0.2957) 
          Percentage CEO Equity -3.0690*** -3.4868*** -2.4651*** -4.8126*** -5.3291*** -3.7784*** 
  (0.3632) (0.3574) (0.6284) (0.7145) (0.7603) (1.1938) 
          Percentage Inside -0.0082*** -0.0072*** -0.0096*** -0.0115*** -0.0097*** -0.0146*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0034) 
          Board Size 0.0291*** 0.0257*** 0.0355*** 0.1432*** 0.1405*** 0.1496*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0093) (0.0117) (0.0138) (0.0184) (0.0218) 
          Gender Dummy -0.1809 -0.3064 -0.0714 -0.5624* -0.6354 -0.4767 
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  E-Indext+1 G-Indext+1 
  (0.1637) (0.2532) (0.2153) (0.3225) (0.5473) (0.3920) 
          Duality 0.2106*** 0.1996*** 0.2271*** 0.4707*** 0.5130*** 0.4382*** 
  (0.0332) (0.0480) (0.0465) (0.0641) (0.0945) (0.0879) 
          Log (Number of Board Meetings) 0.1663*** 0.1142** 0.2318*** 0.4829*** 0.4174*** 0.5595*** 
  (0.0397) (0.0554) (0.0577) (0.0781) (0.1106) (0.1103) 
          Internal CEO 0.1020*** 0.1037** 0.1154*** 0.0277 0.0714 0.0076 
  (0.0320) (0.0473) (0.0438) (0.0632) (0.0966) (0.0841) 
          Intercept 3.4602*** 3.2335*** 4.0684*** 9.2905*** 6.5653*** 12.7490*** 
  (0.5180) (0.7423) (0.7539) (1.0257) (1.5342) (1.4068) 
          Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
  
  
  
  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
  
  
  
  
Adj. R-Sq 0.1191 0.1218 0.1247 0.1766 0.1968 0.1610 
  
  
  
  
  
Number of Observations 7253 3885 3368 7435 3967 3468 
 
Table 6 examines the impact of director excess compensation on managerial entrenchment during the whole sample period (1996-2006), in addition to the 2 
sub-periods (1996-2001 and 2002-2006). The dependent variable is CEO entrenchment, as proxied by both the E-index and the G-index, at time t+1.  
Director excess compensation is measured by utilizing a stochastic frontier approach. We include all the variables that were hypothesized to explain director 
total compensation as control variables. Industry and year dummies are included to control for industry and year specific characteristics. We define industry 
based on Fama and French 48-industry definition. Table 1 provides detailed information on all variables. Robust standard errors are computed following 
White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Director Excess Compensation and Future Firm Performance 
  Abnormal Return FFt+1 Abnormal Return Carhartt+1 
  1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
Director Excess Compensation -0.0022 -0.0048 -0.0040 -0.0015 -0.0053 -0.0024 
  (0.0048) (0.0091) (0.0082) (0.0049) (0.0091) (0.0081) 
          Log (Qt-1) -0.0129*** -0.0186*** -0.0041 -0.0138*** -0.0212*** -0.0031 
  (0.0044) (0.0068) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.0047) 
          Log (ROAt-1) 0.0084 0.0091 0.0035 0.0118** 0.0122 0.0064 
  (0.0053) (0.0101) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0099) (0.0049) 
          Log (Volatility) 0.0092 0.0244 0.0010 0.0131* 0.0326** 0.0017 
  (0.0071) (0.0150) (0.0073) (0.0070) (0.0147) (0.0073) 
          Log (Salest-1) 0.0105*** 0.0132* 0.0083** 0.0115*** 0.0132* 0.0107*** 
  (0.0041) (0.0072) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0070) (0.0041) 
          Log (Employeest-1) -0.0058 -0.0052 -0.0065 -0.0061 -0.0050 -0.0072* 
  (0.0052) (0.0097) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0095) (0.0040) 
          R&Dt-1/At t-1 0.3591*** 0.4914*** 0.0253 0.3377*** 0.4585*** 0.0207 
  (0.0816) (0.1167) (0.0948) (0.0791) (0.1092) (0.0959) 
          Advt-1/At t-1 0.0399 -0.0224 0.1028 0.0483 -0.0057 0.1012 
  (0.0772) (0.1150) (0.0967) (0.0764) (0.1122) (0.0992) 
          Log (Leveraget-1) -0.0016 -0.0042 0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0048 0.0013 
  (0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0067) (0.0014) 
          PPEt-1/Att-1 0.0683** 0.1011* 0.0335** 0.0665** 0.0928 0.0415** 
  (0.0337) (0.0612) (0.0166) (0.0335) (0.0608) (0.0165) 
          Log (Capxt-1) -0.0039 -0.0045 -0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0031 
  (0.0030) (0.0060) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0059) (0.0019) 
          Log (AGE) 0.0038 0.0063 0.0071 0.0001 0.0015 0.0048 
  (0.0208) (0.0305) (0.0153) (0.0205) (0.0296) (0.0156) 
          Percentage CEO Equity -0.0052 -0.0474 0.0305 -0.0067 -0.0531 0.0346 
  (0.0507) (0.0848) (0.0507) (0.0503) (0.0837) (0.0511) 
          Percentage Inside 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
          Board Size -0.0010 -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0000 
  (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0010) 
          Gender Dummy -0.0051 -0.0177 0.0065 -0.0048 -0.0150 0.0042 
  (0.0151) (0.0293) (0.0160) (0.0150) (0.0289) (0.0164) 
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  Abnormal Return FFt+1 Abnormal Return Carhartt+1 
Duality 0.0136*** 0.0114 0.0070 0.0131*** 0.0108 0.0065 
  (0.0045) (0.0075) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0072) (0.0046) 
          Log (Number of Board Meetings) -0.0189 -0.0354 -0.0025 -0.0209* -0.0369 -0.0047 
  (0.0123) (0.0246) (0.0064) (0.0123) (0.0244) (0.0065) 
          Internal CEO -0.0103 -0.0213 -0.0000 -0.0114 -0.0220 -0.0017 
  (0.0108) (0.0215) (0.0046) (0.0107) (0.0214) (0.0046) 
          Intercept -1.3245*** -1.5065*** -1.1075*** -1.2993*** -1.4618*** -1.1082*** 
  (0.0811) (0.1266) (0.0723) (0.0798) (0.1233) (0.0730) 
          Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
  
  
  
  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
  
  
  
  
Adj. R-Sq 0.0124 0.0318 0.0100 0.0122 0.0320 0.0113 
  
  
  
  
  
Number of Observations 8281 4330 3951 8281 4330 3951 
 
Table 7 examines the impact of director excess compensation on the firm’s future performance during the whole sample period (1996-2006), in addition to 
the 2 sub-periods (1996-2001 and 2002-2006). The dependent variable is the firm’s abnormal return, as measured by both the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor 
model and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model, at time t+1.  Director excess compensation is measured by utilizing a stochastic frontier approach. We include 
all the variables that were hypothesized to explain director total compensation as control variables. Industry and year dummies are included to control for 
industry and year specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French 48-industry definition. Table 1 provides detailed information on all 
variables. Robust standard errors are computed following White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Director Excess Compensation and the Entrenchment-Performance Relationship 
Abnormal Return FFt+1 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Excess Dummyt 0.0027 0.0198** 0.0035 0.0353** -0.0001 0.0251** -0.0010 0.0576** -0.0037 0.0057 -0.0031 0.0075 
  (0.0038) (0.0081) (0.0041) (0.0166) (0.0061) (0.0122) (0.0071) (0.0279) (0.0043) (0.0089) (0.0043) (0.0166) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
E-Indext -0.0009 0.0028  
  -0.0058** -0.0002 
 
  0.0048** 0.0068** 
 
  
  (0.0017) (0.0025) 
 
  (0.0027) (0.0037) 
 
  (0.0019) (0.0029) 
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Excess Dummyt * E-Indext  
-0.0074** 
 
  
 
-0.0114** 
 
  
 
-0.0039 
 
  
  
 
(0.0031) 
 
  
 
(0.0048) 
 
  
 
(0.0034) 
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
G-Indext   
0.0004 0.0021 
  
-0.0017 0.0014 
  
0.0024** 0.0029** 
  
  
(0.0009) (0.0013) 
  
(0.0016) (0.0022) 
  
(0.0009) (0.0013) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Excess Dummyt * G-Indext    
-0.0034** 
   
-0.0063** 
   
-0.0011 
  
   
(0.0016) 
   
(0.0028) 
   
(0.0016) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (Qt-1) -0.0109*** -0.0107*** -0.0082** -0.0082** -0.0196*** -0.0196*** -0.0130* -0.0133** 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0018 -0.0018 
  (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (ROAt-1) 0.0061 0.0060 0.0050 0.0050 0.0188** 0.0186** 0.0129 0.0132 -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0058 -0.0058 
  (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (Volatility) 0.0087 0.0084 0.0159* 0.0158* 0.0249* 0.0239* 0.0370** 0.0358** -0.0030 -0.0030 0.0026 0.0027 
  (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (Salest-1) 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0145*** 0.0146*** 0.0123 0.0125 0.0138 0.0144 0.0118** 0.0117** 0.0125*** 0.0124*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (Employeest-1) -0.0117*** -0.0116*** -0.0101** -0.0099** -0.0132* -0.0129* -0.0113 -0.0110 -0.0092** -0.0091** -0.0079* -0.0078* 
  (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
R&Dt-1/Att-1 0.2422*** 0.2424*** 0.3649*** 0.3639*** 0.3892*** 0.3862*** 0.6229*** 0.6205*** 0.0401 0.0406 0.0915 0.0907 
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Abnormal Return FFt+1 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
  (0.0844) (0.0842) (0.0959) (0.0959) (0.1220) (0.1221) (0.1506) (0.1506) (0.1058) (0.1057) (0.1039) (0.1039) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Advt-1/Att-1 -0.0248 -0.0229 0.0199 0.0201 -0.1153 -0.1096 -0.0699 -0.0680 0.0301 0.0298 0.0954 0.0940 
  (0.0768) (0.0766) (0.0818) (0.0817) (0.0994) (0.0994) (0.1104) (0.1102) (0.1152) (0.1152) (0.1164) (0.1165) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (Leveraget-1) -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0006 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
PPEt-1/Att-1 0.0390** 0.0382** 0.0342** 0.0333* 0.0335 0.0336 0.0308 0.0301 0.0369** 0.0361** 0.0326* 0.0323* 
  (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0171) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (Capxt-1) -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0049* -0.0049* -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0073* -0.0073* 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0016 
  (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (AGE) -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0012 -0.0017 0.0037 0.0023 0.0145 0.0149 0.0049 0.0049 
  (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0296) (0.0295) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Percentage CEO Equity -0.0309 -0.0321 -0.0261 -0.0271 -0.0641 -0.0684 -0.0437 -0.0479 0.0175 0.0174 0.0052 0.0054 
  (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0496) (0.0494) (0.0783) (0.0780) (0.0865) (0.0859) (0.0584) (0.0583) (0.0561) (0.0560) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Percentage Inside 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Board Size -0.0019* -0.0019* -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Gender Dummy -0.0127 -0.0125 -0.0132 -0.0136 -0.0089 -0.0092 -0.0109 -0.0125 -0.0118 -0.0117 -0.0144 -0.0144 
  (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0270) (0.0275) (0.0338) (0.0343) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Duality 0.0052 0.0053 0.0047 0.0050 0.0044 0.0046 0.0024 0.0028 0.0024 0.0024 0.0028 0.0030 
  (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Log (Number of  Board  Meetings) -0.0044 -0.0049 -0.0041 -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0061 -0.0053 -0.0074 -0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0036 
  (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
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Abnormal Return FFt+1 1996-2006 1996-2001 2002-2006 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Internal CEO 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0066 0.0072 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0018 
  (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Intercept -1.3430*** -1.3532*** -1.2811*** -1.2943*** -1.5088*** -1.5211*** -1.4974*** -1.5167*** -1.1953*** -1.1998*** -1.1422*** -1.1463*** 
  (0.0710) (0.0712) (0.0762) (0.0768) (0.1192) (0.1194) (0.1381) (0.1389) (0.0730) (0.0731) (0.0757) (0.0759) 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Adj. R-Sq 0.0129 0.0137 0.0173 0.0179 0.0333 0.0346 0.0466 0.0482 0.0149 0.0150 0.0120 0.0118 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
Number of Observations 6721 6721 6227 6227 3440 3440 2865 2865 3281 3281 3362 3362 
 
Table 8 examines the impact of director excess compensation on the entrenchment-performance relationship during the whole sample period (1996-2006), in addition to the 2 sub-periods (1996-2001 and 2002-2006). 
The dependent variable is the firm’s abnormal return, measured following the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model, at time t+1. During each sample period, an excess compensation dummy variable is defined to be 
equal to 1 if director excess compensation is greater than the mean excess compensation during that period and 0 otherwise. We proxy for managerial entrenchment at time t using both the E-index and the G-index. 
We include all the variables that were hypothesized to explain director total compensation as control variables. Industry and year dummies are included to control for industry and year specific characteristics. We 
define industry based on Fama and French 48-industry definition. Table 1 provides detailed information on all variables. Robust standard errors are computed following White (1980) to account for any possible 
heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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ESSAY 2: BOARD COMPOSITION, CEO TURNOVER, AND FIRM 
VALUE: THE EFFECT OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
1.  Introduction  
 Do firms choose the composition of their board of directors such that they are in 
equilibrium? Does the regulation of board structure help improve board efficiency? How does 
the imposition of board regulations affect the firms’ performance? This article attempts to 
answer these questions by examining a unique event whereby firms experience an exogenous 
shock regarding the minimum participation of independent directors on the board. That is, we 
investigate whether the regulation of board structure enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of 
internal monitoring. Often times imposing such regulations may not be optimal. That is, the 
benefits of increased independence might not outweigh its costs. Moreover, the firm 
characteristics and monitoring needs are neither homogenous across firms nor constant over 
time. Accordingly, the imposition of a unified regulation on all firms may not be economically 
efficient.  
An advantage of having insiders as members of the board of directors is that insiders have 
more specific information about the firm. Inside directors are more informed, and thus can make 
better decisions concerning the operations of the firm.
18
 Since outside directors lack firm-specific 
information, there are costs associated with transforming their knowledge and experience to fit a 
certain firm.
19
 In general, adding independent directors to the board raises the costs associated 
                                                 
18
 Vance (1964) suggests a positive association between the percentage of insiders serving on the board and firm 
performance. 
19
 Raheja (2005) presents a theoretical model to study the tradeoff between inside and outside directors. The author 
suggests that as the cost of monitoring increases, the number of outsiders decrease. Moreover, Raheja (2005) 
proposes that when there is an alignment between the objectives of shareholders and managers, boards are generally 
smaller. Whereas Klein (1998) reports no significant relationship between board committees’ independence and firm 
performance, the author argues that insiders’ participation on the board’s investment committee has a positive effect 
on firm performance. 
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with coordination, information asymmetry, and free-rider problems. Maug (1997) suggests that 
monitoring costs for firms with high information asymmetry might outweigh the benefits of 
monitoring. In such a case, adding independent directors to the board might not be optimal for 
the firm. On the other hand, even though they are less informed about the firm operations, 
independent directors are expected to offer more effective and efficient monitoring (Fama and 
Jensen (1983); Weisbach (1988); Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996)). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) suggest that outsiders provide better internal monitoring than insiders due to their 
reputation concerns.
20
 Weisbach (1988) proposes that, since insiders are less likely to confront 
the CEO and challenge his/her decisions, outsiders are more effective in monitoring the firm’s 
management. Borokhovich et al. (1996) document a direct relationship between outside directors 
and the likelihood of replacing a dismissed CEO with an outsider.
21
 In general, there is mixed 
evidence concerning the effect of increased independence on the firm’s governance structure and 
performance.  
This paper adds to the growing body of literature studying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
of 2002 and its effect on the firm’s governance and control mechanisms. We complement the 
existing literature by documenting the impact of changes in board composition on monitoring, 
turnover, and firm value. The current paper breaks from the existing literature by showing that an 
increase in the percentage of independent directors leads to a significant reduction in CEO 
turnover and the turnover-performance sensitivity. We also highlight a converse impact on firm 
value due to the changes in board structure. Our findings rely on an off equilibrium result 
whereby firms are forced to deviate from their endogenously chosen board structure. 
                                                 
20
 Outside directors are generally employed by other firms and, thus, rely on multiple firms for income. 
21
 Borokhovich et al. (1996) highlight a positive market reaction to the appointment of an outsider as the firm’s 
CEO. 
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 We test the time period of four years before and after the passage of SOX to show that an 
exogenous requirement to increase the percentage of independent directors represents a shift 
away from the endogenously chosen equilibrium levels of board composition. Linck, Netter, and 
Yang (2009) show that, following the passage of SOX and the adoption of the NYSE/NASDAQ 
regulations, the boards of directors of publicly traded corporations in the United States became 
larger and consisted of a greater percentage of independent directors. In this paper, we verify the 
increase in the percentage of independent directors following SOX. The passage of this 
legislation had a significant impact on board composition and forced a shift away from the 
previously established equilibrium. Linck et al. (2009) suggest that if boards exacerbate agency 
problems such as moral hazards and adverse selection, regulatory mandates may be beneficial to 
shareholders. Alternatively, if regulations force firms toward an inefficient board structure, these 
mandates may impose deadweight costs on firms and their shareholders. In addition, we argue 
that if the regulation falls short of the intended objective and can be exploited by the CEO, this 
might lead to weaker governance and more expropriation of the shareholders’ wealth. Goldman 
and Slezak (2006) show that although policies and regulations are implemented to decrease 
manipulation, they might have an unforeseen converse effect and, thus, lead to an increase in 
manipulation and fraudulent activities. 
 Our findings suggest that the participation of independent directors increases significantly 
after the passage of SOX. We show that this increase in independence came at the expense of 
insiders and grey directors. Chhaorchharia and Grinstein (2009) find that, in non-complying 
firms, the average number of independent directors arriving post SOX was 1.31 while the 
average number of independent directors leaving post SOX was 0.34 for a net increase of one 
independent director per firm. Additionally, they find that on average 0.38 and 0.37 employee 
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and linked directors left the firm post SOX.  This shift entails a trade-off between the 
contribution of insiders who possess valuable firm specific experience and information, and the 
additional internal control and monitoring that independent directors are expected to provide. 
More efficient monitoring and better governance is what the legislators hoped to achieve by 
implementing SOX. 
 One of the major responsibilities of board members is to monitor the manager’s actions 
and behavior. That is, the board of directors is expected to help maximize shareholders’ wealth 
by ensuring the appropriateness, dedication, honesty, and transparency of the firm’s 
management. Consequently, directors make the crucial decision of dismissing ineffective, 
inappropriate, or fraudulent managers. In this paper, we investigate whether the change in board 
structure enhances the soundness of the firm’s governance structure. Therefore, we focus on the 
impact of increased independence on CEO turnover, which is a direct consequence or measure of 
the quality of internal monitoring (Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)). Weisbach (1988) and 
Perry (2000) show that boards dominated by independent directors are more likely to remove a 
CEO based on poor firm performance than boards dominated by insiders.  
 In contrast to the existing literature on the direct relationship between board 
independence and CEO turnover, our findings suggest a significant drop in the likelihood of 
managerial turnover in the post-SOX period. While it is tempting to attribute such a decline in 
turnover to the better alignment of interests between management and shareholders, our results 
show just the opposite. This paper suggests that while better firm performance leads to lower 
CEO turnover irrespective of board composition, boards dominated by independent directors are 
less likely to terminate a CEO contract because of poor performance in the post-SOX period. 
Moreover, we show that the increase in the participation of independent directors leads to a 
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lower probability of CEO turnover. Back-scratching and socialization between the CEO and the 
directors, especially the CEO appointed independent directors, might be a reasonable explanation 
for the obtained results. The need to comply with SOX, regarding board composition, might have 
provided a good opportunity for CEOs to appoint independent directors, who are not effective 
monitors, but will rather accommodate the CEO’s decisions. That is, SOX may have given the 
CEO an opportunity to increase his/her authority and job security. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Crystal (1991), Lambert et al. (1993), and Boyd (1994). Crystal (1991) 
proposes that independent directors, who are appointed by the CEO, are less likely to vote 
against CEO recommendations. Lambert et al. (1993) and Boyd (1994) find evidence on a direct 
correlation between CEO compensation and board independence.  
We also show that the change in board composition has a negative impact on firm 
performance. During the post-SOX era, our findings suggest a negative and significant 
association between board independence and firm performance. On the other hand, we find that 
insiders’ participation has a direct effect on performance. In addition, whereas the upward 
change in board independence brings about a converse change in firm value, the drop in insiders’ 
participation leads to a reduction in firm value. This signals the importance of insiders in 
improving firm performance during the post-SOX period. Insiders are more informed about firm 
operations whereas independent directors are expected to upgrade the internal control 
mechanism. Consequently, substituting independent directors for insiders entails a trade-off that 
might be costly to shareholders, especially if independent directors fail to provide the intended 
additional monitoring.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature.  Section 3 
describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Sections 4 and 5 empirically test the impact 
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of the regulatory requirements on board composition and, consequently, the implications on CEO 
turnover and firm value. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature Review  
 Empirical findings in corporate governance must be holistically evaluated as seen by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), who suggest that there may be some extraneous factor causing 
equilibrium or alternatively the findings may represent out-of-equilibrium phenomena. In either 
case, the policy procedures or corrections are very different. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
insist that a board of directors exists not merely because of regulatory mandates but that there 
must be some added value. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) propose that a board may arise as a 
result of agency problems, rather than as a solution. It may however be hard to evaluate 
empirical findings because of the endogeneity surrounding board composition as a response to 
the firm’s internal environment. 
The search for a control mechanism, internal or external, to align the objectives of 
management and shareholders receives a lot of attention from academic researchers, 
practitioners, and policy makers as well. Several studies contend that the existing internal control 
provided by the board of directors provides a reasonable mechanism to make it more difficult for 
managers to deviate from shareholders’ objectives. The added value of independent directors has 
been advanced by Fama (1980) and Weisbach (1988). Fama (1980) argues that the likelihood of 
expropriating shareholders’ wealth, by management, is negatively related to the percentage of 
independent directors. Weisbach (1988) suggests that an insider dominated board is less likely to 
remove a CEO due to poor performance than an outsider dominated board. In addition, Perry 
(2000) documents a positive relation between independent directors and effective board 
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monitoring. The author finds no significant relation between board composition and CEO 
turnover for reasons other than performance. However, a board dominated by independent 
directors is more likely to vote for CEO removal after the firm’s poor performance.  
Following the fraudulent business scandals of Enron, Adelphia, Tyco, and WorldCom in 
the early 2000’s, Congress enacted the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002. SOX makes it harder for 
managers to manipulate the content of their financial statements and engage in fraudulent 
activities. The act is intended to increase the amount of monitoring on managers’ behavior by 
encouraging the independence of board committees, improving transparency, and increasing the 
penalties for deceitful activities. In addition, the NYSE/NASDAQ compositional regulatory 
requirements, as of 2003, impose that the majority of directors be classified as independent. 
Imposing such a requirement may not be economically efficient. For efficiency, the benefit due 
to increased monitoring that comes with greater independence must outweigh or at least be equal 
to the costs of monitoring and the inherent free-rider problem.   
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009) and Gordon (2007) highlight the presence of an upward 
trend in the percentage of independent directors before SOX. Gordon (2007) attributes this to 
firms focusing more on maximizing the value of the firm.  Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009) show 
that the increase in the percentage of independent directors hastened after SOX. They provide 
evidence that, following SOX and the regulations by the NYSE and NASDAQ, the number of 
members on the board of directors of U.S. firms increased. They also suggest that boards are 
composed of more outside directors and that board members experience an increase in workload 
and risk after SOX.  Overall, boards are larger and more independent in the post-SOX era. 
 Extant literature is split between two opposing viewpoints on the merit of board 
composition affecting firm value; it may be the case that the ever changing makeup of the 
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corporate landscape allows for both findings. Furthermore it may be the case that both findings 
exist simultaneously due to the issues of endogeneity and diminishing marginal efficiency of 
independence. The latter is theoretically viable because the marginal benefits associated with 
monitoring decrease as free riding and asymmetric information increases. Both costs increase as 
the number of members serving on the board increase.   
 Several studies investigate the effect of board composition on firm value. Much of the 
research has shown no significant relationship between the percentage of outsiders on the board 
and contemporaneous measures of corporate performance (Baysinger and Butler (1985); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Mehran (1995); Klein (1998); Bhagat and Black (1999)). 
However, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find a negative correlation between board independence and 
industry adjusted Tobin's Q. On the contrary, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a positive and 
significant reaction in stock price following the announcement of a new independent director. 
Additional evidence for a positive relationship includes the findings of Nguyen and Nielsen 
(2010), who find a drop in stock price following the death of an independent director.   
The existent literature offers several instances whereby the fraternal relationship between 
the CEO and the board directors may be suboptimal. In general, the CEO may also serve as the 
chair of the board; thus exerting significant influence over the board. Crystal (1991) proposes 
that since the CEO is generally responsible for hiring and removing the outside directors, the 
board of directors is not successful in providing the CEO with the proper levels of compensation. 
In such a case, outside directors will be reluctant to opposing the CEO’s decisions. Lambert et al. 
(1993) and Boyd (1994) show that CEO compensation increases with the proportion of outside 
directors on the board. Moreover, they show that there is a positive relation between CEO 
compensation and the percentage of the board that is appointed by the CEO. 
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Jensen (1993) suggests that the board of directors might not be successful in providing 
efficient and effective monitoring. He argues that the culture of the board of directors might 
prevent constructive criticism. Moreover, board members might put more weight on politeness 
and back scratching instead of truthfulness and honesty. In such a case, poor monitoring leads to 
exaggerated compensation for the CEO. Brick et al. (2006) refer to this “mutual back scratching” 
phenomenon as “cronyism”. Brick et al. (2006) show that there is a positive relation between 
CEO and director compensation.  
3. Sample and Data 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
The sample consists of firms for which sufficient data exists on the COMPUSTAT, 
CRSP, ExecuComp, and RiskMetrics databases.  The time period spans four years prior and post 
the adoption of SOX in 2002.   
ExecuComp data is utilized to identify CEO turnover. Turnover is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if a CEO turnover is documented and 0 otherwise. Firms are said to be 
complying with the board composition requirement if at least 50% of its board members are 
independent directors in a given year. IndepDummy is an independent dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the percentage of independent directors is greater than 50% and 0 
otherwise.  
The firm’s abnormal returns are calculated to measure performance. Abnormal returns 
are computed based on the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model. Therefore, for each firm i in a 
given year t, we employ the following regression model: 
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rid – rfd = αi + β(rMd – rfd) + sSMBd + hHMLd  + εid     (Equation 1) 
 
where the intercept (αi) represents the firm’s abnormal return rid is the return of firm i in day d in 
a certain year. rfd is the simple daily T-bill rate. rMd- rfd, SMBd, and HMLd denote the market risk 
premium, size factor, and book-to-market factor, respectively. We obtain the daily data on these 
factors from Ken French’s website. 
In the post-SOX period, we examine the impact of the changes in board composition on 
CEO turnover and the change in firm value. Therefore, we calculate the following: 
 
ChangeIndependentia = Independentia – MeanIndependentib   (Equation 2) 
ChangeInsideia = Insideia - MeanInsideib      (Equation 3) 
ChangeGreyia = Greyia - MeanGreyib      (Equation 4) 
ChangeARia = ARia - MeanARib     (Equation 5) 
 
where i = 1, 2,…,n refers to firm i and a = 2003,…,2006 refers to the post-SOX period. The 
subscript b refers to the period before the passage of SOX. For example, Independentia is the 
percentage of independent directors for firm i in year a. MeanIndependentib is the mean 
percentage of independent directors for firm i during the pre-SOX period. Therefore, we 
calculate the mean percentage of independent directors for each firm in the pre-SOX period and 
use it as a benchmark. Then, we subtract each firm’s mean percentage of independent directors 
in the pre-SOX period from the percentage of independent directors for each firm during a given 
post-SOX year. Similarly, we compute the change in the percentage of insiders, the change in the 
percentage of grey directors, and the change in the firm value. 
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 The control variables used in this research regarding firm, governance, and CEO 
characteristics are consistent with the existing literature on board composition, managerial 
turnover, and firm performance (Weisbach (1988); Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988); 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990); Yermack (1996); Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997); Perry (2000); 
Goyal and Park (2002); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008); Linck, 
Netter, and Yang (2009); Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009), Guo and Masulis (2010)). Detailed 
information on all variables is provided in Table 9. Industry fixed effects are used to control for 
industry unobserved specifics. We define industry based on Fama-French (1997) industry 
definition. To control for any possible heteroskedasticity, we utilize White (1980) robust 
standard errors. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 10 Panel A presents a comparison between the pre-SOX and the post-SOX eras 
regarding the percentage of non-complying firms. Firms are said to be in compliance if more 
than 50% of its board members are independent directors.  
Due to the passage of the SOX and the regulations enforced by NYSE and NASDAQ, we 
expect an increase in the percentage of complying firms following SOX. Table 10 Panel A shows 
that, on average, 28.75% of firms were non-complying in the pre-SOX era. However, as 
expected, the mean percentage of non-complying firms drops to only 11.53% following SOX. 
These levels of compliance (noncompliance) in the pre (post) SOX era are consistent with the 
findings of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and a working paper by Guo and Masulis 
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(2010).
22
 Although the largest jump in compliance occurs between 2002 and 2003 there is still a 
significant amount of noncompliance in the post SOX era and after the NYSE and NASDAQ 
adopted the new listing requirements. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) attribute this 
discrepancy to a difference in the definition of ‘independent’ applied by the exchanges and  
RiskMetrics. NYSE and NASDAQ classify a former employee of the firm as independent if at 
least three years has passed since their employment ended. RiskMetrics, on the other hand, never 
classifies a former employee as independent. Additionally, the NYSE and NASDAQ allow for 
certain business relationships to be deemed “insignificant” provided they do not exceed a certain 
payment threshold, whereas RiskMetrics may consider these directors linked. Finally, the NYSE 
and NASDAQ provide an exemption to the rules for controlled companies, those that have at 
least 50% of the voting power held by one owner, group, or corporation. In such cases the 
companies need not comply with the listing requirements regarding independent directors.  
In Table 10 Panel B, we provide descriptive statistics on board composition in the two 
periods before and after the implementation of the SOX. The results show a significant increase 
in the percentage of independent directors following the passage of SOX. In the pre-SOX period, 
the mean percentage of independent directors is 62.448%. On the other hand, the mean 
percentage of independent directors increases to 70.633% in the post-SOX period. This is 
consistent with the findings of Linck et al. (2009) who highlight an increase in the percentage of 
independent directors following SOX. The results suggest that, in the post-SOX period, firms 
increase the number of independent directors serving on their boards at the expense of insiders 
                                                 
22
 Guo and Masulis (2010) show that firms which were obliged to comply with the SOX and NYSE/NASDAQ 
regulations experience an improvement in monitoring relative to firms which were already in compliance with the 
regulations. 
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and grey directors. We document a significant reduction in the percentage of insiders and grey 
directors following the passage of SOX. 
4. Board Composition, Monitoring, and Turnover 
4.1 Board Composition and SOX 
 One might argue that the documented change in board composition during the post-SOX 
period might be due to factors other than the passage of SOX. That is, other factors, such as the 
need for monitoring, might have led firms to increase the participation of independent directors. 
Table 11 presents a regression of the percentage of the three types of directors on the SOX 
dummy variable and various control variables. That is, all else equal, we document the variation 
in board composition due to the implementation of SOX. The results confirm the findings of 
Table 10 Panel B. The post-SOX period experienced an increase in the percentage of 
independent directors, while the representation of non-independent directors went down. That is, 
the increase in the participation of independent directors came at the expense of a lower 
participation by insiders and grey directors.  
The results suggest a positive relation between firm size and independence.  Therefore, 
consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), monitoring costs increase as the firm becomes more 
complex. If independent directors are effective internal monitors, one would expect the CEO, 
who is also the chair of the board, to prefer lower levels of monitoring. Thus, he/she would 
appoint fewer independent directors.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) propose a negative relation 
between independence and the CEOs power and control. Interestingly, we find that the 
percentage of independent directors is higher when the CEO serves as the chair of the board. 
Moreover, a negative relation is found between duality and both types of non-independent 
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directors. Since the CEO is generally responsible for hiring independent directors, his/her 
preference for more independent directors signals ineffective monitoring and the possibility of 
back scratching between the CEO and independent directors. This is consistent with several 
previous research findings (Crystal (1991); Lambert et al. (1993); Boyd (1994)). We find a 
positive association between CEO total compensation and board independence.  Also, the firm is 
expected to require higher levels of monitoring when the firm risk is higher (Bryan et al. (2000) 
and Brick et al. (2006)). However, our findings suggest a negative and significant relation 
between firm volatility and the percentage of independent directors. 
4.2 CEO Turnover and SOX 
In this section, we investigate the impact of increased independence on CEO turnover.  
The appreciation in the percentage of independent directors following SOX may improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of internal monitoring. In such a case, the manager is subject to 
more pressure as he/she is held more accountable for firm performance. In Table 12, a probit 
model is utilized to study the impact of SOX on CEO turnover. The results highlight a significant 
reduction in the probability of CEO turnover after SOX. This suggests that, in the post-SOX 
period, managers experience less pressure since the prospect of losing their jobs is lower. 
Therefore, SOX might not have been successful in monitoring the managers. The increase in 
independent directors might have provided CEOs with more protection. Mutual back scratching 
and socialization at the top, rather than the better alignment of owners and managers objectives, 
might have led to the lower turnover probability.  
Table 12 also suggests that firm size has a positive impact on CEO turnover. This is 
consistent with the findings of Huson, Parino, and Starks (2001). ROA, which measures the 
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firm’s accounting performance, has an inverse and significant relation with turnover. Warner, 
Watts, and Wruck (1988), among others, suggest similar results. Contrary to Yermack (1996), 
we observe a direct association between board size and CEO turnover. As expected, we 
demonstrate a negative relation between turnover and duality. When the CEO is also the chair of 
the board, he/she has more power and control over the decisions and actions of the board. This 
would in turn diminish the probability of CEO turnover.  
4.3 Impact of Independence on the Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
An alternative hypothesis may suggest that the drop in CEO turnover following SOX is 
the outcome of the better alignment of interests between the CEO and the firm owners. That is, 
SOX increases the soundness of the firm’s governance structure and manages to better align the 
shareholders’ and management objectives. Consequently, this might reduce the need for 
managerial turnover.  
Accordingly, we investigate the impact of board independence on the turnover-
performance sensitivity during the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. This helps differentiate 
whether the reduction in turnover probability following SOX is due to inefficient monitoring or 
better alignment of interests between owners and management. Consistent with Perry (2000) and 
Huson, Parino, and Starks (2001), we use both accounting and market performance measures in 
our analysis of the effect of independence on the turnover-performance sensitivity.  Weisbach 
(1988) and Perry (2000) suggest that boards dominated by independent directors are more likely 
to remove a CEO based on poor performance.  
Table 13, columns 1 and 3, presents a regression of Turnover on the independence 
dummy variable (IndepDummy), ROA (as a measure of accounting performance), and various 
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control variables. We show that the relation between independence and turnover switches in sign 
following SOX. The relation between the independence dummy variable and turnover is positive 
prior to SOX. However, in the post-SOX period, the relation is negative. While the relation 
between the independence dummy variable and turnover is not statistically significant during 
both periods, the difference between both coefficient estimates is statistically significant at the 
10% level of significance, using a t-test. The results also suggest that the post-SOX turnover-
performance sensitivity is not significantly different than the pre-SOX turnover-performance 
sensitivity.
23
 That is, in both periods, poor performance increases the likelihood of CEO 
turnover. Therefore, following SOX, the manager is not subject to an additional pressure of 
losing his/her job because of poor performance.  
In columns 2 and 4, we interact the return on assets with the independent dummy variable 
to examine the effect of independence on the turnover-performance sensitivity. During the pre 
and post SOX periods, the relation between performance and turnover is negative and significant 
when the percentage of independent directors is less than or equal to 50%. Contrary to the 
findings of Weisbach (1988) and Perry (2000), in both periods, high board independence does 
not increase the likelihood of performance related CEO dismissals. Therefore, board 
independence does not seem to impose additional pressure on the manager to enhance his/her 
performance. Surprisingly, the coefficient estimate for the independence-performance interaction 
variable is positive and significant in the post-SOX period. This suggests that board 
independence reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity following SOX. Therefore, boards 
dominated by independent directors are less likely to remove a CEO due to poor firm 
                                                 
23
 A t-test is used to test whether the turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly different between both periods, 
before and after SOX. 
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performance, as compared to boards dominated by non-independent directors. These results 
suggest that the increase in independent directors following SOX does not lead to more efficient 
monitoring and better governance. Instead, back-scratching, socialization, and other forms of 
collusion between the CEO and the CEO influenced independent directors might explain the 
lower job security pressure on CEOs subsequent to SOX. 
Using the one period lagged risk adjusted returns to proxy for the firm’s market 
performance, Table 14 examines the effect of independence on the turnover-market performance 
sensitivity. Risk adjusted returns are computed following the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor 
model. In general, our findings in columns 1 and 3 are very much like those reported in Table 13. 
However, during the post-SOX period, the inverse relation between abnormal returns and 
managerial turnover is not significant. Thus, we do not find significant evidence suggesting that 
managers are dismissed due to poor stock market performance following SOX. During both the 
pre-SOX and post-SOX periods, columns 2 and 4 document that the turnover-market 
performance sensitivity is not significant when boards are not dominated by independent 
directors. As for the independence-performance interaction variable, our results demonstrate a 
change in the sign of the coefficient estimates during the post-SOX period. Whereas the 
coefficient estimate of the independence-performance interaction variable is negative prior to 
SOX, it switches to positive following the passage of SOX. Both coefficient estimates are, 
however, not significant. Accordingly, these findings suggest that the increased participation of 
independent directors does not imply an appreciation in the likelihood of performance related 
managerial turnover. The increased participation of independent directors does not seem to 
improve the firm’s internal monitoring. 
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4.4 Changes in Board Composition and CEO Turnover 
We now examine the effect of the changes in board composition on CEO turnover 
following the passage of the SOX. Table 15 presents a probit model whereby CEO turnover is 
regressed on the post-SOX change in the percentage of the three different groups of directors. 
Table 15 documents an inverse relationship between the change in the percentage of independent 
directors and CEO Turnover. That is, the increase in the percentage of independent directors, in 
the post-SOX period, reduces the pressure on the CEO in terms of his/her job security. The 
relation between the percentage of inside directors and CEO turnover is positive but 
insignificant. As for grey directors, we observe a positive and significant relation between the 
change in the percentage of grey directors and turnover. That is, a decrease in the percentage of 
grey directors reduces the probability of CEO turnover.  
The results follow the same trend established in earlier sections. The hypothesis which 
associates the reduction in CEO turnover following SOX with better governance is refuted. On 
the contrary, the lower CEO turnover associated with the positive change in the percentage of 
independent directors suggests weaker corporate governance. Thus, board composition changes 
might have given the manager the opportunity to increase the percentage of CEO influenced 
independent directors and, thus, gain more control over the board and achieve higher job 
security. Our findings are consistent with several previous studies examining the relation 
between the CEO and the outside directors (Crystal (1991); Lambert et al. (1993); Boyd (1994)). 
These papers suggest that the board of directors might not be successful in providing the CEO 
with proper levels of compensation since the CEO is generally responsible for hiring and 
removing the outside directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that directors are generally 
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reluctant to oppose the CEO’s decisions as he/she control their appointments. In such a case, 
directors may not be efficient and effective in monitoring the CEO’s actions and behavior.  
5. Board Composition and Firm Performance 
 In this section, we study how firm value is affected by board structure changes. In Table 
16, we regress the firm’s risk-adjusted returns on the percentage of the three different types of 
board directors during both the pre and post SOX periods. During 1998-2001, Table 16 suggests 
that, though insignificant, the coefficient estimates of independence and insiders’ participation 
have opposite signs. While the coefficient estimate for the percentage of independent directors is 
positive, the coefficient estimate for the percentage of inside directors is negative. Regulatory 
requirements were intended to improve the firms’ governance structure by promoting board 
independence. However, our findings demonstrate that the regulators may not have been 
successful in accomplishing their objectives. During the post-SOX era, we highlight a negative 
and significant association between board independence and firm performance. In addition, we 
demonstrate that insiders’ participation has a significantly positive effect on firm performance.  
Thus, despite the good intentions of legislators to protect shareholders, the trend towards 
increased independence has converse implications on shareholders’ wealth. 
 Table 16 also highlights a change in the sign of the relation between leverage and firm 
performance during the post-SOX period. In general, the literature provides mixed evidence on 
the effect of leverage on firm value.  During the pre-SOX period, consistent with Yermack 
(1996), we find an inverse relation between board size and firm value. In addition, our results 
propose that an increase in CEO age brings about a deterioration in the firm’s performance. The 
evidence suggests a positive association between the firm’s risk and its abnormal returns. 
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We also investigate, in the post-SOX period, the effect of board composition changes on 
firm performance. That is, we study the relation between firm value and the change in the 
percentage of the three different groups of directors. If the increase in independence leads to 
more efficient monitoring and better governance, we expect the change in board composition to 
help improve firm performance, other things being equal. On the other hand, in line with our 
previous results, if the legislation leads to inefficient monitoring and forces firms away from 
their endogenously determined equilibrium, we anticipate a negative association between 
independence and firm value.  
Table 17 presents the results of regressing firm performance on the change in 
independence, change in insider participation, change in the percentage of grey directors, and 
various control variables. The results demonstrate an inverse association between the change in 
board independence and firm value.  Moreover, our findings document a positive and significant 
relation between the change in the percentage of insiders and firm performance. That is, the 
reduction in the participation of insiders in the post-SOX era leads to a reduction in shareholders’ 
wealth.
24
   
The results emphasize that an increase in the percentage of independent directors, which 
came at the expense of inside and grey directors, adversely affects firm performance. This is 
consistent with our previous findings that board structure changes do not lead to better 
governance and more efficient monitoring. Furthermore, in the post-SOX period, the reduction in 
the percentage of inside directors seems to have an adverse effect on shareholders. Insiders seem 
to possess invaluable information and expertise concerning firm-specific operations. On the other 
hand, independent directors may lack the necessary experience and information about the firm. 
                                                 
24
 We obtain similar results when using the change in risk adjusted return (ChangeAR) as the dependent variable. 
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The problem of replacing insiders by independent directors is aggravated when independent 
directors fail to provide more efficient monitoring and better governance.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper adds to the intellectual debate on the efficacy of corporate boards as a 
monitoring mechanism by studying the consequences of the SOX legislation and the subsequent 
changes to the NYSE/NASDAQ listing requirements. Consequently, we also examine the 
implications of board structure changes on CEO turnover and firm value. Therefore, we focus on 
a specific period in which there is an exogenous shift from the general market equilibrium to one 
with imposed regulation.  
Our findings document a boost in the participation of independent directors following 
SOX. This comes at the expense of a reduction in the percentage of insiders serving on the 
board. We also document a drop in CEO turnover during the post-SOX period. We suggest that 
such a decline in turnover is not due to better governance and control. Instead, the increase in 
independent directors has a negative impact on the turnover-performance sensitivity. Moreover, 
in the post-SOX period, we demonstrate that the increase in board independence has an adverse 
effect on the likelihood of managerial turnover. Therefore, contrary to the legislators’ objectives, 
our results suggest that the increase in independent directors reduces monitoring efficiency and 
the soundness of the governance structure. The passage of SOX may have presented an 
opportunity for the CEO to appoint new “independent” directors. These newly-appointed 
directors might be influenced by the CEO and be willing to accommodate his/her actions and 
decisions. This new environment offers the CEO more protection and greater job security.  
71 
 
Furthermore, this study examines the impact of board composition changes on firm value. 
We show that firm value is conversely affected by board structure changes. This article 
documents that higher independence and lower involvement of insiders on the board have a 
negative effect on firm performance during the post-SOX period. This suggests that the change 
in board structure may have led to an unfavorable and costly trade-off between independent 
directors and the more informed inside directors. 
Following the exogenous increase in board independence, firms appear to employ 
independent directors at a level greater than optimal.  Our results suggest that forcing firms away 
from their endogenously determined board structures has a negative effect on the shareholders’ 
interests and wealth.  
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Tables 
Table 9. Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable Definition 
Firm Sizet-1 The natural logarithm of Total Assets in time t-1. 
Salest-1/Att-1 The ratio of Sales to Total Assets in time t-1. 
Capxt-1/Att-1 The ratio of Capital Expenditures to Total Assets in time t-1. 
Leveraget-1 The ratio of long term Debt to Total Assets in time t-1 
Liquidityt-1 The difference between Current Assets and Current Liabilities divided by Total Assets in time t-1 
ROA t-1 The ratio of Income Before Extraordinary Items to Total Assets in time t-1 
Board Size The total number of board members in a given year.  
CEO Age The CEO's Age 
Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
 
CEO Total Compensation 
 
CEO total compensation is calculated by adding the CEO’s salary, bonus, the Black-Scholes value of options granted, the 
value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts, other annual and all other total compensation.  The natural 
logarithm of CEO total compensation is used. 
 
Volatility 
 
The Black-Scholes volatility measure.  The natural logarithm of volatility is used. 
 
Sox A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period and 0 otherwise. 
AR FF The firm’s abnormal return is computed following the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model.   
Turnover A dummy variable equal to 1 if a CEO turnover is documented in a given year or 0 otherwise. 
Independent 
The percentage of independent directors serving on the board. Directors are identified as independent based on the 
RiskMetrics classification. 
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Variable Variable Definition 
Inside 
The percentage of inside directors serving on the board. Directors are identified as insiders based on the RiskMetrics 
classification. 
Grey 
The percentage of grey directors serving on the board. Directors are identified as grey based on the RiskMetrics 
classification. 
IndepDummy 
 An independent dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of independent directors is greater than 50% 
and 0 otherwise.  
ChangeIndependent 
The change in the percentage of independent directors in a given post-SOX year is calculated as the percentage of 
independent directors less the mean percentage of independent directors for that firm during the pre-SOX period. 
ChangeInside 
The change in the percentage of insiders in a given post-SOX year is calculated as the percentage of insiders less the mean 
percentage of insiders for that firm during the pre-SOX period. 
ChangeGrey 
The change in the percentage of grey directors in a given post-SOX year is calculated as the percentage of grey directors 
less the mean percentage of grey directors for that firm during the pre-SOX period. 
ChangeAR 
The change in firm value in a given post-SOX year is calculated as industry adjusted Tobin’s Q less the mean industry 
adjusted Tobin’s Q for that firm during the pre-SOX period. 
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A 
Period Number of Complying Firms 
Number of Non-Complying 
Firms 
Total Number of Firms 
Percentage of Non-
Complying Firms 
Pre-SOX 974 393 1367 28.75% 
Post-SOX 1189 155 1344 11.53% 
 
Panel B 
 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
Independent 62.448 66.667 70.633
a
 71.429
b
 
Inside 22.121 20.000 17.876
a
 14.286
b
 
Grey 15.431 12.500 11.484
a
 10.000
b
 
 
Table 10 Panel A presents the percentage of complying and non-complying firms for the 2 periods: Pre-SOX and Post-SOX. Complying firms are those 
firms in which the percentage of independent directors is greater or equal to 50%. Non-complying firms are those firms in which the percentage of 
independent directors is less than 50%. Table 10 Panel B presents descriptive statistics on the composition of the board of directors during the pre and post 
SOX periods. The superscript (a) denotes that the difference in means between the 2 samples is statistically significant at the 1% level, using a t-test. The 
superscript (b) suggests that the difference in medians between the 2 samples is statistically significant at the 1% level, using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test.   
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Table 11. Board Composition and SOX 
 
Independent Inside Grey 
Sox 7.7642*** -4.0698*** -3.6966*** 
 
(0.3538) (0.2289) (0.3038) 
    
Firm Sizet-1 1.2132*** -0.3156** -0.8973*** 
 
(0.1918) (0.1251) (0.1527) 
    
Salest-1/ATt-1 0.8360*** -0.8248*** -0.0132 
 
(0.3040) (0.2089) (0.2604) 
    
Capxt-1/ATt-1 -7.5708* 14.4145*** -6.8456** 
 
(4.1496) (2.8538) (3.4673) 
    
Leveraget-1 3.1721** -4.2110*** 1.0436 
 
(1.3194) (0.8438) (1.1468) 
    
Liquidityt-1 1.9032 3.6940*** -5.6014*** 
 
(1.3469) (0.8599) (1.1869) 
    
ROAt-1 -4.5421*** 3.9930*** 0.5539 
 
(1.3189) (0.9345) (1.2726) 
    
Board Size 0.0246 -0.6381*** 0.6129*** 
 
(0.0957) (0.0657) (0.0786) 
    
CEO Age -0.1016*** 0.1056*** -0.0042 
 
(0.0237) (0.0176) (0.0199) 
    
Duality 2.1344*** -0.9423*** -1.1936*** 
 
(0.3671) (0.2419) (0.3162) 
    
CEO Total Compensation 1.3387*** -1.0370*** -0.3031* 
 
(0.2193) (0.1519) (0.1638) 
    
Volatility -2.2219** 1.5710** 0.6456 
 
(1.0151) (0.6916) (0.9066) 
    
Intercept 46.8625*** 31.3618*** 21.8014*** 
 
(2.2803) (1.5505) (1.9130) 
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Independent Inside Grey 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES 
Adj. R-Sq 0.1026 0.1259 0.0351 
Number of Observations 8341 8341 8341 
    
Table 11 highlights presents a regression of the percentage of independent directors, the percentage of insiders, and the percentage of grey directors on the 
SOX dummy variable and various control variables. All regressions are implemented using industry fixed effects to control for industry specific 
characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. See Table 9 for detailed information on all variables. We 
compute robust standard errors following White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 12. CEO Turnover and SOX 
CEO Turnover 
 
Sox -0.2346*** 
 
(0.0377) 
  
Firm Sizet-1 0.0599*** 
 
(0.0188) 
  
Salest-1/ATt-1 0.0299 
 
(0.0306) 
  
Capxt-1/ATt-1 -0.3119 
 
(0.4115) 
  
Leveraget-1 -0.2305 
 
(0.1404) 
  
Liquidityt-1 -0.0740 
 
(0.1317) 
  
ROAt-1 -0.8132*** 
 
(0.2081) 
  
Board Size 0.0236** 
 
(0.0092) 
  
CEO Age -0.0031 
 
(0.0026) 
  
Duality -0.5468*** 
 
(0.0378) 
  
CEO Total Compensation 0.0090 
 
(0.0178) 
  
Volatility 0.1712 
 
(0.1080) 
  
Intercept -1.1356*** 
 
(0.2493) 
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CEO Turnover 
 
  
Industry Dummies YES 
Adj. R-Sq 0.0515 
Number of Observations 8371 
 
Table 12 presents a probit regression in which CEO Turnover is regressed on the SOX dummy variable and various control variables. Industry dummies are 
included to control for industry specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. See Table 9 for detailed 
information on all variables. We compute robust standard errors following White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Robust standard 
errors are presented in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 13. Impact of Independence on the Turnover-Accounting Performance Sensitivity 
CEO Turnover Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IndepDummy 0.0752 0.0684 -0.1186 -0.2080** 
 
(0.0597) (0.0621) (0.0783) (0.0867) 
     ROAt-1 -0.7345*** -0.8886** -0.8779*** -2.7847*** 
 
(0.2686) (0.3576) (0.3376) (0.8515) 
     IndepDummy * ROAt-1  
0.1850 
 
1.9834** 
  
(0.4394) 
 
(0.8760) 
     Firm Sizet-1 0.0518* 0.0520* 0.0666** 0.0674** 
 
(0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0263) (0.0264) 
     Salest-1/ATt-1 0.0380 0.0385 0.0194 0.0192 
 
(0.0400) (0.0399) (0.0476) (0.0476) 
     Capxt-1/ATt-1 -0.0199 -0.0187 -0.9987 -0.9479 
 
(0.5267) (0.5267) (0.6824) (0.6831) 
     Leveraget-1 -0.1467 -0.1443 -0.3037 -0.3090 
 
(0.1891) (0.1896) (0.2132) (0.2134) 
     Liquidityt-1 -0.1375 -0.1323 -0.0407 -0.0166 
 
(0.1856) (0.1857) (0.1902) (0.1911) 
     Board Size 0.0207* 0.0205* 0.0320** 0.0315** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
     CEO Age -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0050 -0.0050 
 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
     Duality -0.4808*** -0.4816*** -0.6055*** -0.6075*** 
 
(0.0546) (0.0545) (0.0541) (0.0540) 
     CEO Total Compensation 0.0172 0.0172 -0.0068 -0.0071 
 
(0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0263) (0.0263) 
     Volatility 0.3957** 0.3888** -0.0251 -0.0440 
 
(0.1679) (0.1664) (0.1571) (0.1581) 
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CEO Turnover Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Intercept -1.3688*** -1.3629*** -1.1105*** -1.0247*** 
 
(0.3589) (0.3596) (0.3588) (0.3599) 
     Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-Sq 0.0479 0.0480 0.0653 0.0666 
Number of Observations 3953 3953 4385 4385 
 
Table 13 utilizes a probit model to examine the impact of board independence on the turnover-accounting performance sensitivity during the pre-SOX and 
post-SOX periods. The dependent variable is CEO turnover. The IndepDummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of 
independent directors is greater than 50% and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are included to control for industry specific characteristics. We define industry 
based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. See Table 9 for detailed information on all variables. We compute robust standard errors following 
White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
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Table 14. Impact of Independence on the Turnover-Market Performance Sensitivity 
CEO Turnover Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IndepDummy 0.0767 -0.3853 -0.1280 -0.0379 
 
(0.0602) (0.4195) (0.0786) (0.1749) 
     AR FFt-1 -0.1600*** -0.0917 -0.0224 -0.0729 
 
(0.0395) (0.0730) (0.0326) (0.0916) 
     IndepDummy * AR FFt-1  
-0.0941 
 
0.0569 
  
(0.0844) 
 
(0.0976) 
     Firm Sizet-1 0.0392 0.0389 0.0740*** 0.0742*** 
 
(0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
     Salest-1/ATt-1 0.0224 0.0236 0.0208 0.0203 
 
(0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0477) (0.0477) 
     Capxt-1/ATt-1 0.1017 0.1047 -1.0811 -1.0694 
 
(0.5327) (0.5333) (0.6823) (0.6824) 
     Leveraget-1 -0.0725 -0.0756 -0.1987 -0.1973 
 
(0.1830) (0.1829) (0.2126) (0.2128) 
     Liquidityt-1 -0.0947 -0.1002 -0.0202 -0.0182 
 
(0.1899) (0.1897) (0.1902) (0.1905) 
     Board Size 0.0227* 0.0229* 0.0322** 0.0322** 
 
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
     CEO Age -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0056 -0.0055 
 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
     Duality -0.4787*** -0.4799*** -0.6032*** -0.6026*** 
 
(0.0550) (0.0550) (0.0543) (0.0543) 
     CEO Total Compensation 0.0244 0.0244 -0.0140 -0.0141 
 
(0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
     Volatility 0.5004*** 0.5032*** 0.1583 0.1591 
 
(0.1617) (0.1612) (0.1389) (0.1390) 
     Intercept -2.2267*** -1.8956*** -1.2505*** -1.3335*** 
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CEO Turnover Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
 
(0.4086) (0.5035) (0.3615) (0.3894) 
     Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-Sq 0.0485 0.0489 0.0614 0.0615 
Number of Observations 3905 3905 4330 4330 
 
Table 14 utilizes a probit model to examine the impact of board independence on the turnover-market performance sensitivity during the pre and post SOX 
periods. The dependent variable is CEO turnover. The IndepDummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of independent directors 
is greater than 50% and 0 otherwise. The firm’s abnormal returns are calculated following the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model. Industry dummies are 
included to control for industry specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. See Table 9 for detailed 
information on all variables. We compute robust standard errors following White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Robust standard 
errors are presented in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
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Table 15. Changes in Board Composition and CEO Turnover 
CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) 
ChangeIndependent -0.0054** 
  
 
(0.0021) 
  
    ChangeInside 
 
0.0043 
 
  
(0.0034) 
 
    ChangeGrey 
  
0.0039* 
   
(0.0022) 
    Firm Sizet-1 0.0569** 0.0521* 0.0557* 
 
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0289) 
    Salest-1/ATt-1 0.0371 0.0250 0.0308 
 
(0.0541) (0.0540) (0.0539) 
    Capxt-1/ATt-1 -1.1161 -1.0468 -1.1009 
 
(0.8272) (0.8183) (0.8197) 
    Leveraget-1 -0.1466 -0.1424 -0.1408 
 
(0.2353) (0.2343) (0.2351) 
    Liquidityt-1 -0.1361 -0.0994 -0.1350 
 
(0.2142) (0.2139) (0.2145) 
    ROAt-1 -0.8391** -0.8497** -0.8551** 
 
(0.3784) (0.3840) (0.3775) 
    Board Size 0.0325** 0.0363** 0.0332** 
 
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159) 
    CEO Age -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0032 
 
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
    Duality -0.5808*** -0.5783*** -0.5790*** 
 
(0.0583) (0.0582) (0.0582) 
    CEO Total Compensation -0.0097 -0.0128 -0.0066 
 
(0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0275) 
    Volatility -0.1465 -0.1434 -0.1331 
 
(0.2224) (0.2216) (0.2218) 
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CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) 
    Intercept -1.1432*** -1.1402*** -1.1908*** 
 
(0.3963) (0.3982) (0.3949) 
    Industry Dummies YES YES YES 
Adj. R-Sq 0.0644 0.0625 0.0629 
Number of Observations 3684 3684 3684 
 
Table 15 utilizes a probit model to examine the impact of the changes in board composition on CEO turnover following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. The dependent variable is CEO turnover. Industry dummies are included to control for industry specific characteristics. We define industry based on 
Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. See Table 9 for detailed information on all variables. We compute robust standard errors following White 
(1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 16. Board Composition and Firm Performance 
AR FFt Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Independentt 0.0008   
-0.0094*** 
  
 
(0.0008) 
  
(0.0016) 
  
       Insidet  
-0.0009 
  
0.0196*** 
 
  
(0.0012) 
  
(0.0025) 
 
       Greyt   
-0.0005 
  
0.0026 
   
(0.0010) 
  
(0.0018) 
       Firm Sizet-1 -0.0075 -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0091 -0.0145 -0.0161 
 
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0264) 
       Salest-1/ATt-1 0.0271 0.0270 0.0277 0.0311 0.0391 0.0219 
 
(0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0429) (0.0426) (0.0430) 
       Capxt-1/ATt-1 -0.2741 -0.2706 -0.2844 -1.7583*** -2.0077*** -1.7152*** 
 
(0.2883) (0.2879) (0.2876) (0.6424) (0.6437) (0.6434) 
       Leveraget-1 -0.2621** -0.2644** -0.2605** 0.6174*** 0.6677*** 0.5511*** 
 
(0.1089) (0.1090) (0.1091) (0.1752) (0.1755) (0.1755) 
       Liquidityt-1 0.1418 0.1460 0.1398 -0.5800*** -0.6737*** -0.6017*** 
 
(0.1094) (0.1095) (0.1093) (0.1665) (0.1661) (0.1670) 
       ROAt-1 -0.0932 -0.0935 -0.0981 -0.3612* -0.3836* -0.3457* 
 
(0.2111) (0.2117) (0.2107) (0.2064) (0.2051) (0.2072) 
       Board Size -0.0171** -0.0175*** -0.0168** 0.0189 0.0328** 0.0173 
 
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
       CEO Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0162*** -0.0171*** -0.0153*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
       Duality -0.0142 -0.0134 -0.0135 0.3837*** 0.3826*** 0.3623*** 
 
(0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0461) (0.0460) (0.0462) 
       CEO Total Compensation 0.0434** 0.0433** 0.0443*** -0.0305 -0.0285 -0.0440* 
 
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0256) 
       Volatility 0.3819*** 0.3826*** 0.3808*** 2.1700*** 2.1687*** 2.1896*** 
 
(0.1191) (0.1192) (0.1191) (0.3078) (0.3053) (0.3101) 
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AR FFt Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
       Intercept -4.9121*** -4.8477*** -4.8647*** -1.6215*** -2.6556*** -2.1652*** 
 
(0.1875) (0.1873) (0.1839) (0.3693) (0.3592) (0.3607) 
       Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-Sq 0.0171 0.0170 0.0170 0.1046 0.1093 0.0978 
Number of Observations 3927 3927 3927 4316 4316 4316 
 
Table 16 presents a regression of the firm’s abnormal returns on the percentage of the three different types of board directors during both the pre and post 
SOX periods. Abnormal returns are calculated following the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model. All regressions are implemented using industry fixed 
effects to control for industry specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. See Table 9 for detailed 
information on all variables. We compute robust standard errors following White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Robust standard 
errors are presented in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
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Table 17. Changes in Board Composition and Firm Performance 
AR FFt (1) (2) (3) 
ChangeIndependent -0.0080*** 
  
 
(0.0017) 
  
    ChangeInside 
 
0.0164*** 
 
  
(0.0024) 
 
    ChangeGrey 
  
0.0009 
   
(0.0018) 
    Firm Sizet-1 -0.0125 -0.0163 -0.0169 
 
(0.0255) (0.0254) (0.0255) 
    Salest-1/ATt-1 0.0688 0.0535 0.0508 
 
(0.0473) (0.0466) (0.0475) 
    Capxt-1/ATt-1 -1.1521* -1.1178 -1.0436 
 
(0.6921) (0.6869) (0.6956) 
    Leveraget-1 0.2088 0.2030 0.2244 
 
(0.1886) (0.1876) (0.1887) 
    Liquidityt-1 -0.8479*** -0.7666*** -0.8200*** 
 
(0.1768) (0.1763) (0.1777) 
    ROAt-1 0.2035 0.2067 0.1556 
 
(0.2000) (0.1921) (0.1958) 
    Board Size 0.0255* 0.0318** 0.0294** 
 
(0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0136) 
    CEO Age -0.0108*** -0.0118*** -0.0110*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
    Duality 0.3451*** 0.3460*** 0.3486*** 
 
(0.0491) (0.0489) (0.0492) 
    CEO Total Compensation -0.0615** -0.0768*** -0.0611** 
 
(0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0266) 
    Volatility 3.2982*** 3.2873*** 3.3179*** 
 
(0.1826) (0.1809) (0.1829) 
    Intercept -2.5685*** -2.4129*** -2.6382*** 
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AR FFt (1) (2) (3) 
 
(0.3167) (0.3188) (0.3175) 
    Industry Dummies YES YES YES 
Adj. R-Sq 0.1353 0.1400 0.1298 
Number of Observations 3631 3631 3631 
 
Table 17 presents a regression of the firm’s abnormal returns on the change in independence, change in insider participation, change in the percentage of 
grey directors. Abnormal returns are calculated following the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model. All regressions are implemented using industry fixed 
effects to control for industry specific characteristics. We define industry based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. See Table 9 for detailed 
information on all variables. We compute robust standard errors following White (1980) to account for any possible heteroskedasticity. Robust standard 
errors are presented in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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ESSAY 3: GOVERNANCE AND FIRM VALUE: THE EFFECT OF A 
RECESSION 
1. Introduction 
Economic conditions may have a substantive influence on the soundness of the firm’s 
governance structure and characteristics. This paper examines the impact of business cycle 
changes on the relation between corporate governance and firm value. Few studies explore the 
consequences of the macroeconomic environment on the firm’s value and characteristics. 
Philipon (2004) presents a theoretical model to demonstrate that firms with a bad governance 
structure have a higher response to aggregate shocks than firms with a good governance 
structure.  Korajczyk and Levy (2003) suggest that the timing of debt issuance is significantly 
affected by macroeconomic conditions. Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2004) show that capital 
structure and credit risk are highly influenced by economic conditions. Oxelheim, Wihlborg, and 
Zhang (2008) propose that the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on performance and 
compensation have a negative effect on the ability of managerial compensation to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders.  
This paper adds to the existing literature by investigating the relation between market 
conditions and corporate governance. We show that the firm’s governance structure is vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the business cycle. Moreover, we examine the impact of the macroeconomic 
environment on the relation between the firm’s governance structure and its value.  
We suggest that CEO turnover increases during a recession. Our results support this 
hypothesis by showing that relative industry turnover increases during bad economic conditions. 
Due to the increase in managerial turnover throughout a recession, CEOs are subject to increased 
industry pressure. This is anticipated to have a positive influence on the manager’s effort and 
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behavior. In that sense, industry turnover seems to act as a control mechanism against swings in 
macroeconomic conditions. 
We also investigate whether managerial entrenchment is affected by changes in the 
business cycle. Managers are said to be entrenched when they have power and control over the 
firm such that they are able to pursue their own private benefits and interests instead of 
maximizing the shareholders’ wealth. We propose that the recession provides managers with a 
good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame 
the poor performance on the recession. The Entrenchment Index (E-index) constructed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) is used to measure managerial entrenchment. The results demonstrate that 
managers are more entrenched during economic downturns. That is, bad economic conditions 
amplify the manager’s influence and authority within the firm. Consequently, agency problems 
are expected to be more pronounced during economic downturns.  
In addition, this study investigates the impact of turnover and entrenchment on the value 
of the firm under different macroeconomic conditions. During economic downturns, the results 
demonstrate a direct association between turnover and firm value. Moreover, during a recession, 
we show that the increase in turnover, or excess turnover
25
, has a positive influence on the value 
of the firm. We also highlight a negative association between managerial entrenchment and firm 
performance. Furthermore, we propose that the effect of entrenchment on firm value is sensitive 
to macroeconomic changes. Our findings show that, during bad economic conditions, the 
increase in entrenchment, or excess entrenchment
26
, has a converse effect on firm value. The 
                                                 
25
 Excess turnover for each firm in a given recession year is defined as total industry turnover less the median total 
industry turnover for that firm during nonrecession years. 
26
 Excess entrenchment for each firm in a given recession year is defined as the E-index less the median E-index for 
that firm during nonrecession years. 
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results also suggest that, during economic downturns, the negative impact of entrenchment on 
firm value outweighs the positive impact of turnover. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the research 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 offers empirical 
evidence on the impact of the macroeconomic environment on industry turnover and managerial 
entrenchment.  Section 5 investigates the effect of industry turnover and managerial 
entrenchment on firm value during different economic conditions. Section 6 provides robustness 
checks. Section 7 concludes our research. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
During economic downturns, a firm is usually closer to financial distress and the manager 
is confronted with elevated job insecurity. Gilson (1989) suggests that financial distress leads to 
higher management turnover. The author shows that managerial turnover is higher for distressed 
firms than it is for non-distressed firms.  Moreover, in a recession, poor decisions and behavior 
on the part of the CEO might worsen the already poor firm performance. In addition, the existing 
manager might lack the talent and skills required to face the challenges and obstacles presented 
by aggregate economic shocks. In this paper, we hypothesize that managerial turnover in a given 
industry amplifies during a recession. Thus, due to the increased risk of losing his/her job, the 
manager is subject to more pressure during economic downturns.  
We also investigate the impact of business cycle changes on managerial entrenchment. 
As managers become more entrenched, they gain more authority and protection against 
monitoring and governance systems. Demsetz (1983) proposes that the CEO is more willing to 
take on self-centered negative net present value projects when he/she has more power over the 
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board of directors. In general, an increase in managerial entrenchment is said to amplify agency 
problems and lead to higher agency costs. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) suggest a positive 
relation between their G-index and agency costs. Managers generally tend to divert firm 
resources, operate less efficiently, and take on self-centered decisions when replacing them 
becomes harder and more costly. An extensive literature suggests that the manager is motivated 
to pursue projects that are value deteriorating for shareholders, as long as he/she can extract 
private benefits from such projects (eg. Baumol (1959), Williamson (1964), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) emphasize that the 
severity of this agency problem increases when managers are entrenched and have enough power 
to prevent takeover attempts. Moreover, several studies propose that the imposition of state 
takeover laws leads to higher agency costs (Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997); 
Bertrand and Mallainathan (1999a, 1999b, and 2000); Garvey and Hanka (1999)). Furthermore, 
Baum, Chakraborty, Han, and Liu (2009) use the G-index to proxy for agency costs.
27
  
A recession may offer the manager an opportunity to camouflage his/her self-centered 
decisions that have a negative effect on the firm’s value. In such a case, a recession is expected 
to increase the manager’s consumption of private benefits and expropriation of shareholders’ 
wealth. In other words, managers might try to extract as much private benefits as possible and 
then blame the poor performance on the recession. Johnson et al. (2000) examine the role that 
corporate governance played during the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998. They show that poor 
governance structures had a significant impact on the decrease in stock prices and the exchange 
rate depreciations during the crisis. They suggest that managers are more likely to steal and 
                                                 
27
 Since agency costs cannot be observed, Baum, Chakraborty, Han, and Liu (2009) suggest that the G-index can be 
used to assess the soundness of the governance structure. 
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consume private benefits during bad economic conditions. This leads to more depreciation and 
stock price deterioration during the crisis. Accordingly, we hypothesize that managerial 
entrenchment increases during a recession and, thus, leads to lower firm value.  
An alternative hypothesis suggests that managerial entrenchment might decrease during a 
recession. In normal conditions, the CEO might be entrenched or engage in perquisite 
consumption. That is, agency problems might arise due to the conflict of interest between the 
CEO and the shareholders. Jensen (1986) presents his free cash flow hypothesis in which he 
suggests that free cash flow in the hands of the managers might induce them to engage in 
expansionary activities by investing in negative NPV projects. Accordingly, in normal 
conditions, the CEO might be more entrenched and have more control over the firm and this 
exacerbates the agency problem.  Therefore, agency problems, as proxied by managerial 
entrenchment, might be less severe during periods of economic distress.
28
 However, our results 
do not support this hypothesis. 
This paper also examines the effect of industry turnover and managerial entrenchment on 
firm value during different macroeconomic circumstances. The rise in relative industry turnover 
during bad economic conditions is anticipated to elevate the pressure on the manager and, thus, 
have a direct impact on the manager’s effort and behavior. That is, the risk of losing his/her job 
induces the CEO to exert more effort in order to satisfy shareholders and maintain his/her office. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that, during a recession, industry turnover has a positive impact on the 
value of the firm.  On the other hand, CEO entrenchment is expected to exacerbate agency 
problems and, thus, reduces firm value. Several studies show that firms with low shareholder 
                                                 
28
 In general, during bad economic conditions, one would expect lower levels of free cash flow in the hands of the 
managers. Accordingly, the agency problem might be less pronounced during a recession. 
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rights have inferior performance as compared to firms with high shareholder rights (Gompers et 
al. (2003), Core et al. (2006), Bebchuk et al. (2009)). Since managerial entrenchment is predicted 
to increase during a recession, the converse impact of entrenchment on the value of the firm is 
anticipated to be more pronounced during that period. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data and Variable Definitions 
This paper utilizes data from Compustat, ExecuComp, and RiskMetrics. Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual is used to obtain data regarding the firm’s financial information. 
ExecuComp provides information regarding the compensation and characteristics of the firm’s 
top executives. Finally, the RiskMetrics database offers data on the firm’s corporate governance.  
We examine the impact of market conditions on corporate governance and firm value 
during the period 2001 – 2009. In order to identify recession periods, business cycle data is 
obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The NBER identifies 2 
recession cycles during the period 2001 – 2009:  
(i) March 2001 – November 2001 
(ii) December 2007 – June 2009 
As a result, four recession years are identified: 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009. We define 
Rdummy as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is a recession year and 0 
otherwise.
29
 To improve the robustness of our results, two additional macroeconomic variables, 
which are highly correlated with economic conditions, are used. The two macroeconomic 
                                                 
29
 Consistent with Hund et al. (2010) and Hovakimian (2011), a given year is classified as a recession year if it 
includes at least one recession month. 
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variables are the GDP growth rate and the Default Spread.
30
 An increase in GDP growth suggests 
an improvement in economic conditions. GDP growth is calculated using data from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The probability of default increases during bad 
economic conditions. Therefore, an increase in the default spread signals a deterioration in the 
economic situation. Default spread is calculated as the difference between the average annual 
yield on Moody’s Baa corporate bonds and the average annual yield on Moody’s Aaa corporate 
bonds.
31
 
We first investigate whether a recession leads to an increase in CEO turnover in a given 
industry. Data from ExecuComp is used to identify CEO turnover. A CEO turnover is 
documented if the CEO for a given year is different from the CEO for the previous year. 
IndTurnover is defined as the relative CEO turnover in a given industry in a given year. 
Industry is defined following the Fama & French (1997) 48-industry definition.   
We also study the effect of economic conditions on the soundness of the firm’s 
governance structure. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) present their G-index as a measure of 
the manager’s authority and influence over a given firm. The calculation of the G-index is based 
on 24 governance provisions. An increase in the firm’s G-index indicates an increase in the 
manager’s power and a reduction in the soundness of the firm’s governance structure.32 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) suggest that only six of the 24 provisions have a significant 
impact on the value of the firm. They propose that the negative impact of the G-index on firm 
                                                 
30
 Both macroeconomic variables are computed on an annual basis. 
31
 In unreported results, we find a very strong correlation between the two macroeconomic variables and the 
recession.  
32
 The G-index cannot be calculated using the RiskMetrics database for the period 2007 – 2009. In 2007, 
RiskMetrics followed a new methodology, which is in accordance to ISS conditions and specifications, to collect the 
governance data. This new methodology does not permit the calculation of the G-index since it does not gather all 
the variables required to construct the index. 
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value, documented by Gompers et al. (2003), is mainly due to six provisions. Thus, they 
construct their E-index based on these six provisions. The six provisions are: golden parachutes, 
poison pills, staggered boards, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, 
supermajority requirements for merger amendments, and limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments. Consequently, we use the Entrenchment Index (E-Index) constructed by Bebchuk 
et al. (2009) in order to study the effect of a recession on managerial entrenchment.  
Furthermore, this article examines the effect of the firm’s governance structure on firm 
value under different market conditions. Tobin’s Q has long been used as a measure of firm 
value by many researchers (e.g. Bebchuk et al. (2009)). In order to account for industry 
characteristics, we use the Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q to proxy for firm value. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated following Chung & Pruitt (1994).
33
 In a given year, Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s Q and its industry median Q.  
In addition, we investigate the impact of excess turnover and excess entrenchment on the 
change in firm value during economic downturns. In order to calculate excess industry turnover 
during a given recession year, we first calculate the median relative industry turnover for each 
firm during the nonrecession period.
34
 In such a case, excess turnover for each firm in a given 
recession year is defined as relative industry turnover less the median relative industry turnover 
for that firm during good economic conditions. Similarly, we calculate excess managerial 
entrenchment and the change in industry adjusted Tobin’s Q.  
 
ExcessTurnoverir = IndTurnoverir - MedianIndTurnoverig                 (Equation 1) 
                                                 
33
 Since the calculation of Tobin’s Q is complex, Chung and Pruitt (1994) present a simpler estimation of Tobin’s Q. 
They show that their proxy for Tobin’s Q explains 96.6% of the variation in Tobin’s Q. 
34
 The nonrecession period comprises the following years: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. 
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ExcessEir = Eir - MedianEig                                     (Equation 2) 
            ChangeIndAdjQir = IndAdjusted Qir - MedianIndAdjusted Qig                    (Equation 3) 
 
where i = 1, 2,…,n refers to firm i and r = 2001, 2007, 2008, 2009 refers to recession year r. The 
subscript g refers to the period of good economic conditions. For example, IndTurnoverir is the 
relative industry turnover for firm i in recession year r. MedianIndTurnoverig is the median 
relative industry turnover for firm i during good economic conditions. 
As for control variables, we use variables that are generally suggested by the literature. 
Our control variables include: firm size, capital expenditures, leverage, liquidity, ROA, CEO 
age, board size, duality, and percentage independence. Detailed information on all variables used 
in this paper is provided in Table 18.  Furthermore, in all regressions, we apply year random 
effects in order for our results not to be driven by a general trend towards a certain change in 
industry turnover and/or managerial entrenchment overtime. We also include industry dummies 
to control for unobserved industry specific characteristics. In addition, we use White (1980) 
robust standard errors to account for any possible heteroskedasticity.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 19 presents descriptive statistics on relative industry turnover and managerial 
entrenchment under different economic conditions. Table 19 Panel A shows that, using both the 
mean and median, relative industry turnover is higher during the recession period. The mean 
relative industry turnover increases from 0.114 in the nonrecession period to 0.126 in the 
recession period. Moreover, we highlight an increase in managerial entrenchment during 
economic downturns. We document an increase in the mean E-index from 2.373 in the 
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nonrecession period to 3.236 in the recession period.
35
 In addition, Table 19 Panel B 
demonstrates that both excess industry turnover and excess entrenchment are positive and 
significantly different from zero during the period of economic distress. Therefore, Table 19 
suggests that both industry turnover and managerial entrenchment increase during recessionary 
periods.  
4. Impact of Recession on Industry Turnover and Managerial Entrenchment 
4.1 Turnover and Recession 
We first investigate whether relative industry turnover rises during periods of economic 
distress. The following regression model is used to study the effect of a recession on CEO 
relative industry turnover: 
 
   IndTurnoverit = α + β1Rdummyt + Control Variablesit + εit (Equation 4) 
 
where i = 1, 2, …, n refers to firm i and t = 2001, 2002, …, 2009 refers to year t. The 
coefficient estimate of Rdummy is expected to be positive and significant. This indicates that 
CEO turnover increases during a recession. Since turnover is measured at the industry level, the 
control variables are also measured at the industry level. Therefore, we use the total number of 
CEOs who also serve as chairs of the board in a given industry instead of the duality dummy 
variable. As for all other control variables, we use their industry means in a given year to predict 
industry turnover. The results are reported in Table 20.  
                                                 
35
 The results are similar when we calculate the mean and median of the average industry turnover and average 
entrenchment for each firm during both economic periods. That is, using both the mean and median, the average 
industry turnover and average entrenchment for each firm are higher in the recession period than they are in the 
nonrecession period. 
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Table 20 column 1 shows that relative industry turnover is significantly higher during 
recessionary periods. Accordingly, managers are said to face a higher risk of losing their jobs 
during bad economic conditions.  Furthermore, Table 20 columns 2 and 3 underline the relation 
between the two additional macroeconomic variables and relative industry turnover. We show 
that industry turnover increases significantly with the reduction in the GDP growth rate. 
Furthermore, industry turnover is significantly higher when the default spread is higher. These 
findings suggest that managers are subject to additional industry pressure during economic 
downturns. The increased pressure is expected to have a positive impact on managerial effort and 
behavior. 
Consistent with Huson, Parino, and Starks (2001), the results document a direct 
relationship between firm size and turnover. Moreover, relative industry turnover is positively 
related to capital expenditures and leverage. Consistent with Yermack (1996), board size is 
negatively associated with turnover. The results also highlight a negative relation between 
turnover and age. A similar association between turnover and age is reported by Agrawal and 
Nasser (2010). 
4.2 Entrenchment and Recession 
We now investigate the impact of the macroeconomic environment on managerial 
entrenchment. The following regression model is used: 
 
     E-Indexit = α + β1Rdummyt + Control Variablesit + εit          (Equation 5) 
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Table 21 column 1 shows that managerial entrenchment is significantly higher during the 
recession. This suggests that the manager may be able to exploit the opportunity presented by 
bad economic conditions to extract more private benefits. In such a case, the manager may take 
advantage of the recession to camouflage his/her self-centered decisions and, consequently, 
blame the poor firm performance on the bad economic circumstances. Agency problems are, 
therefore, anticipated to be more pronounced during recessionary periods.  Johnson et al. (2000) 
suggest that the managerial consumption of private benefits and theft is expected to increase 
during bad conditions. 
Table 21 columns 2 and 3 highlight the impact of GDP growth and default spread on 
managerial entrenchment. The results emphasize that managers take advantage of bad economic 
conditions to increase their entrenchment. Managerial entrenchment is found to increase 
significantly with: (i) the increase in the default spread, or (ii) the decrease in the GDP growth 
rate. 
In addition, Table 21 documents a negative relation between the size of the firm and 
managerial entrenchment. This suggests that agency problems are more pronounced in small 
firms. The results show that capital expenditure, which proxies for growth opportunities or “hard 
spending”, is negatively related to managerial entrenchment. Moreover, liquidity is found to 
have a converse impact on the firm’s E-index. Firms with higher liquidity are expected to have 
higher investment opportunities and make more investments. Therefore, the presence of 
investment opportunities and the ability to invest are anticipated to mitigate agency problems. 
The results also highlight a positive relation between board size and entrenchment. Several 
studies suggest that managers are not successfully or efficiently monitored by large boards of 
directors (e.g. Yermack 1996). Surprisingly, we find that CEO age is negatively related to 
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entrenchment. It is generally suggested that managers gain more control and power over the firm 
as their age increase. However, the results in this paper do not support this hypothesis. In 
addition, our findings highlight a positive association between board independence and 
managerial entrenchment. Dah, Frye, and Hurst (2011) show that, during the post-SOX period, 
board independence is directly associated with managerial job security and immunity. 
5. Industry Turnover, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm Value 
5.1 Impact of Turnover and Entrenchment on Firm Value 
In this section, we start by examining the marginal impact of both turnover and 
entrenchment on firm value during different economic conditions. Consistent with the literature, 
we use the Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q as a proxy for the value of the firm.36 The increase in 
industry turnover during a recession is expected to increase the pressure on the manager and, 
thus, have a positive impact on the manager’s effort and behavior. This is anticipated to help 
improve the performance of the firm. On the other hand, since managerial entrenchment triggers 
an increase in agency problems, a negative relation between the E-index and Tobin’s Q is 
expected. We also investigate whether the marginal impact of managerial entrenchment on firm 
value is greater during bad economic periods. The following regression model is used: 
 
IndAdjustedQit = α + β1Rdummyt + β2IndTurnoverit +                                     (Equation 6) 
β3 (Rdummyt * IndTurnoverit) + β4E-indexit + β5 (Rdummyt * E-indexit) +  
Control Variablesit + εit 
 
                                                 
36
 Using Tobin’s Q instead of Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q yields similar results in all of our regressions. 
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The impact of CEO turnover on firm value during normal economic conditions is 
represented by β2. The overall impact of CEO turnover on the value of the firm during a 
recession is represented by the summation of β2 and β3. A significant β3 suggests that the 
marginal impact of turnover on firm value is more significant during a recession than it is during 
normal conditions. Similarly, the relation between managerial entrenchment and firm value 
during normal economic conditions is revealed by β4. The total impact of managerial 
entrenchment on firm value during a recession is demonstrated by the summation of β4 and β5. 
The effect of managerial entrenchment on the value of the firm is more significant during a 
recession if β5 is significant. 
Table 22 presents the results of regressing industry adjusted Tobin’s Q on relative industry 
turnover, entrenchment, and various control variables. During normal conditions, the results 
highlight a negative association between industry turnover and firm value. As for the 
recessionary period, we find that the turnover interaction variable is positive and significant. 
Furthermore, the impact of industry turnover on the value of the firm is significantly higher 
during the recession period as opposed to the nonrecession period. Therefore, Table 22 shows 
that, during a recession, the overall impact of industry turnover on the value of the firm is 
positive.  Therefore, we propose that industry turnover imposes more pressure on managers 
during a recession and, thus, induces them to exert more effort. This leads to an appreciation in 
the value of the firm. Concerning managerial entrenchment, the results demonstrate a negative 
and significant relation between entrenchment and firm value during nonrecession periods. The 
coefficient estimate for the entrenchment interaction variable is negative; however, it is not 
significant. That is, the marginal impact of entrenchment on the value of the firm during bad 
economic conditions is not significantly different than that during normal economic conditions. 
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In addition, column 3 shows that the coefficient estimates for both IndTurnover and the 
turnover interaction variable turn insignificant when managerial entrenchment is introduced in 
the regression equation. 
Furthermore, in unreported results, we compute the standardized coefficient estimates in 
order to compare the marginal impacts of industry turnover and managerial entrenchment. The 
results suggest that, during a recession, the overall negative marginal impact of entrenchment on 
firm value outweighs the overall positive impact of industry turnover on firm value.
37
  
In addition, we document a positive and significant relation between capital expenditures 
and the value of the firm. Capital expenditures proxies for the firm’s growth and investment 
opportunities. Therefore, consistent with the literature, firms with more growth opportunities 
have higher values. The results highlight a positive relation between liquidity and firm value. 
This is consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) who suggest that liquidity 
proxies for the firm’s investment profitability and, thus, has a positive impact on firm value. 
Moreover, we find that ROA, which also proxies for the firm’s profitability, is positively related 
to the value of the firm. Consistent with Yermack (1996), we find that firms with larger boards 
of directors have lower values. Yermack (1996) proposes that smaller boards of directors are 
more effective in monitoring the firm’s management. This is mainly due to the free-riding 
problem which exacerbates as boards become larger. The results also show that an increase in 
CEO age leads to a reduction in the value of the firm. Finally, we highlight a negative 
association between board independence and firm value. Dah, Frye, and Hurst (2011) 
demonstrate that the increased participation of independent directors, following the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, has a converse impact on firm performance. 
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 Results are available upon request. 
107 
 
Using the default spread dummy variable instead of the recession dummy variable 
(Rdummy) to identify bad economic conditions, Table 23 investigates the impact of the 
macroeconomic environment on the relation between the firm’s governance structure and its 
value. In a given year, the default spread dummy variable is defined to be equal to 1 if the default 
spread is higher than the full sample period median default spread and zero otherwise. Therefore, 
a value of one for the default spread dummy signals bad economic conditions, and vice versa.
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The results reported in Table 23 are very much alike those presented in Table 22. However, the 
negative relation between relative industry turnover and firm value is no longer significant 
during normal conditions. In addition, the coefficient estimate for the entrenchment interaction 
variable is negative and significant. Thus, Table 23 suggests that the converse impact of 
managerial entrenchment on firm value is more pronounced during economic downturns.  
5.2 Impact of Excess Turnover and Excess Entrenchment on Firm Value 
In this section, the impact of excess turnover and excess entrenchment on the change in 
firm value is examined. Therefore, we run the following regression model: 
 
ChangeIndAdjQir = α + β1ExcessTurnoverir + β2ExcessEir + Control Variablesir  + εir (Equation 7) 
 
 Table 24 presents the results in which the change in industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is 
regressed on excess turnover, excess entrenchment, and various control variables. Column 1 
proposes a positive relation between excess industry turnover and the change in firm value. 
                                                 
38
 We also conduct our analysis by employing a GDP growth dummy variable instead of the recession dummy 
variable to identify economic downturns. However, the results are identical to those reported in Table 22. That is, 
the identified recession years (2001, 2007, 2008, 2009) are the same years in which the GDP growth rate is below 
the median GDP growth rate, calculated based on the whole sample period. 
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Therefore, during the recession period, the increase in industry turnover has a positive impact on 
the change in firm value. Concerning the change in managerial entrenchment, the results suggest 
a negative and significant relation between excess entrenchment and the change in firm value. 
Thus, the increase in managerial entrenchment has a negative effect on the change in the value of 
the firm during economic downturns.  
In unreported results, we again compute the standardized coefficient estimates to 
compare the impacts of excess turnover and excess entrenchment on the change in firm value. 
The results document that, during the recession period, the impact of excess entrenchment on the 
change in firm value outweighs that of excess turnover.
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6. Robustness Checks 
One of the main problems that arise in empirical studies examining the relation between the 
firm’s governance structure and its value is an endogeneity problem. In this paper, we try to 
resolve this issue by (i) including industry dummy variables in all of our regressions to control 
for industry specific characteristics, and/or (ii) using instrumental variables and conducting two 
stage least square regressions. In this section, we explore the robustness of our results when 
using the instrumental variables technique to resolve any potential endogeneity. We use the one 
period lagged values of turnover and entrenchment as their respective instrumental variables. 
Accordingly, LagIndTurnover and (Rdummy * LagIndTurnover) are used as 
instruments for relative industry turnover and the interaction variable between industry turnover 
and the recession. The results are presented in Table 25 columns 1 and 3. Confirming our 
previous results, Table 25 demonstrates that the coefficient estimate for the turnover interaction 
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 Results are available upon request. 
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variable is positive and significant. Therefore, during a recession, industry pressure has a positive 
impact on the value of the firm.   
Bebchuk et al. (2009) introduce the E-index and examine its effect on the value of the 
firm. The authors regress firm value (as proxied by Tobin’s Q or Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q) 
on the E-index. They highlight a negative and significant relation between entrenchment and the 
value of the firm. In their paper, they also address the endogeneity problem or the simultaneity 
issue.  They argue that it might not be clear whether higher levels of entrenchment lead to lower 
firm values, or whether managers of lower valued firms are generally more entrenched. 
However, Bebchuk et al. (2009) suggest that high levels of managerial entrenchment lead, at 
least partially, to lower firm values. They show that, though firms with high entrenchment levels 
had lower values at the beginning of the sample period, these firms experience a further 
reduction in their values over time.  
To improve the robustness of our results, we conduct a two stage least squares by using 
the one period lag E-index and the multiplication of the lag E-index by the recession dummy 
variable as instruments for the E-index and the entrenchment interaction variable. The results are 
reported in Table 25 columns 2 and 3. Consistent with our previous findings, we highlight a 
negative and significant relation between managerial entrenchment and the value of the firm 
during normal economic conditions. Moreover, though insignificant, the coefficient estimate for 
the entrenchment interaction variable is negative.  
In addition, Table 26 presents similar analysis when using the default spread dummy 
variable instead of the recession dummy variable. However, the results are almost identical to 
those reported in Table 23. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relation between corporate governance and the value of the firm 
during different phases of the business cycle. We show that changes in the firm’s 
macroeconomic environment have a substantial effect on its governance structure and 
characteristics. 
We suggest that, due to the bad economic conditions, turnover in a given industry is 
expected to increase. The increase in industry turnover is anticipated to increase the industry 
pressure on managers and, thus, induce them to exert more effort in order to satisfy shareholders. 
The results show that industry turnover is significantly higher during periods of economic 
distress. 
This research also examines the impact of economic conditions on the levels of 
managerial entrenchment. The results highlight a significant increase in managerial 
entrenchment during economic downturns. In general, firms are anticipated to increase anti-
takeover provisions during bad macroeconomic circumstances in order to prevent hostile 
takeover. Moreover, we suggest that bad economic conditions present a good opportunity for 
managers to camouflage their activities and extract more private benefits. In such a case, 
managers might take advantage of the situation and blame the poor performance on the 
recession. Therefore, agency problems are expected to increase during a recession. As a result, 
the increase in managerial entrenchment leads to a reduction in the firm’s value and, thus, fosters 
the deterioration in economic conditions.  
In addition, we examine the impact of industry turnover and managerial entrenchment on 
the value of the firm under different macroeconomic conditions. The results show that industry 
turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite effects on firm value during economic 
111 
 
downturns. While industry turnover has a positive impact on firm performance, managerial 
entrenchment is negatively associated with firm value. Furthermore, we demonstrate that excess 
industry turnover has a positive effect on the change in firm value. Our findings also suggest that 
the increase in managerial entrenchment during a recession has a negative impact on the change 
in firm value. Finally, we document that the negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm 
value during a recession outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. 
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Tables  
Table 18. Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable Definition 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of Total Assets. 
Capx/At The ratio of Capital Expenditures to Total Assets. 
Leverage The ratio of long term Debt to Total Assets. 
Liquidity The difference between Current Assets and Current Liabilities divided by Total Assets 
ROA The ratio of EBITDA to Total Assets 
Board Size The total number of board members in a given year.  
CEO Age The CEO's Age 
Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
Percentage Independence The percentage of board members who are independent directors. 
Rdummy A dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is a recession year and 0 otherwise. 
Tobin’s Q 
Tobin's Q calculated following Chung & Pruitt (1994). It is equal to the sum of the Market Value of Equity, 
liquidating value of Preferred Stock, and Debt divided by the book value of Total Assets.  
IndAdjusted Q Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q is calculated as the difference between the firm’s Q and its industry median Q.  
IndTurnover The relative CEO turnover in a given industry in a given year.  
E-Index Entrenchment Index calculated following Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
GDP Growth The percentage change in GDP from year t-1 to year t. 
 
Default Spread 
 
The difference between the average annual yield on moody’s baa corporate bonds and the average annual yield on 
moody’s aaa corporate bonds. 
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Variable Variable Definition 
Default Dummy 
The default spread dummy variable is defined to be equal to 1 if the default spread in a given year is higher than the 
full sample period median default spread and zero otherwise. 
ExcessTurnover 
ExcessTurnover for each firm in a given recession year is defined as relative industry turnover less the median 
relative industry turnover for that firm during nonrecession years.  
ExcessE 
ExcessE for each firm in a given recession year is defined as the E-index less the median E-index for that firm during 
nonrecession years. 
ChangeIndAdjQ 
ChangeIndAdjQ for each firm in a given recession year is defined as the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q less the median 
industry adjusted Tobin’s Q for that firm during the nonrecession period.  
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Table 19. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A  
  NonRecession Period    Recession Period  
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median 
Total Industry Turnover 0.114 0.108 
 
0.126
a
 0.123
b
 
E-Index 2.373 2.000   3.236
a
 3.000
b
 
 
Panel B 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment during different macroeconomic conditions for the period 
2001 – 2009. Based on data from the NBER, we identify 4 recession years: 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Industry is defined following Fama and French 48-
industry definition.  Panel A highlights the mean and median for both IndTurnover and E-index under the 2 economic periods. IndTurnover is defined as the 
relative CEO turnover in a given industry in a given year. E-index is calculated following Bebchuk et al. (2009). The superscript (a) denotes that the 
difference in means between the 2 samples is statistically significant at the 1% level, using a t-test. The superscript (b) suggests that the difference in 
medians between the 2 samples is statistically significant at the 1% level, using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Panel B documents the mean and median 
for both ExcessTurnover and ExcessE during the recession period. ExcessTurnover for each firm in a given recession year is defined as relative industry 
turnover less the mean relative industry turnover for that firm during nonrecession years. ExcessE for each firm in a given recession year is defined as the E-
index less the mean E-index for that firm during nonrecession years. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
The t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are implemented to analyze the significance of the mean and median, respectively.  
 
Variable Mean Median 
ExcessTurnover 1.117*** 0.600*** 
ExcessE 0.908*** 1.000*** 
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Table 20. Industry Turnover and Macroeconomic Conditions 
IndTurnover (1) (2) (3) 
      Rdummy 0.0159*** 
 
  
  (0.0013) 
 
  
      GDP Growth 
 
-0.2159***   
  
 
(0.0280)   
      Default Spread 
  
0.0037*** 
  
  
(0.0007) 
      Mean Firm Size 0.0297*** 0.0332*** 0.0343*** 
  (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) 
      Mean Capx/AT 0.0489 0.0704 0.1781*** 
  (0.0548) (0.0609) (0.0568) 
      Mean Leverage 0.1810*** 0.1886*** 0.2071*** 
  (0.0252) (0.0259) (0.0255) 
      Mean Liquidity 0.0024 -0.0066 -0.0067 
  (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0110) 
      Mean ROA 0.0649*** 0.0489*** 0.0474** 
  (0.0192) (0.0187) (0.0186) 
      Mean Board Size -0.0141*** -0.0150*** -0.0152*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
      Mean CEO Age -0.0045*** -0.0047*** -0.0048*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
      Total Duality 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      Mean Independence -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0014*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
      Intercept 0.4109*** 0.4205*** 0.3738*** 
  (0.0438) (0.0447) (0.0435) 
  
  
  
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      R-Sq 0.1658 0.1575 0.1541 
      Number of Observations 15602 15602 15602 
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Table 20 presents the regressions of IndTurnover on 3 different macroeconomic variables and various control variables for the period 2001 – 2009. Based on 
data from the NBER, we identify 4 recession years: 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Rdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is a recession year and 
0 otherwise. GDP growth is calculated using data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Default spread is calculated as the difference 
between the average annual yield on Moody’s Baa corporate bonds and the average annual yield on Moody’s Aaa corporate bonds. IndTurnover is defined 
as the relative CEO turnover in a given industry in a given year. Industry is defined following Fama and French 48-industry definition. Since turnover is 
measured at the industry level, the control variables are also measured at the industry level. We use the total number of CEOs who also serve as chairs of the 
board in a given industry instead of the duality dummy variable. For all other control variables, we use their industry means in a given year to predict 
IndTurnover. See Table 18 for details on the control variables. Year random effects is employed in order for the results not to be driven by a general trend 
towards a certain change in industry turnover overtime. Industry dummy variables are included to control for unobserved industry specific characteristics. 
Following White (1980), we compute robust standard errors. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 21. Managerial Entrenchment and Macroeconomic Conditions 
E-Index (1) (2) (3) 
Rdummy 0.7967*** 
 
  
  (0.0269) 
 
  
GDP Growth 
 
-13.6372***   
  
 
(0.5287)   
Default Spread 
  
0.2639*** 
  
  
(0.0169) 
      Firm Size -0.1040*** -0.1040*** -0.0997*** 
  (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0124) 
      Capx/AT -1.1126*** -1.2121*** -0.8402** 
  (0.3451) (0.3424) (0.3506) 
     Leverage 0.0512 0.0772 0.077 
  (0.0953) (0.0957) (0.0977) 
      Liquidity -0.7703*** -0.7719*** -0.7876*** 
  (0.0930) (0.0943) (0.0962) 
      ROA -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.001 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
      Board Size 0.0618*** 0.0619*** 0.0595*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0073) 
      CEO AGE -0.0043** -0.0045** -0.0029 
  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Duality -0.007 -0.0175 -0.0780*** 
  (0.0269) (0.0273) (0.0277) 
      Percentage Independent 0.0194*** 0.0195*** 0.0220*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Intercept 1.3703*** 2.2878*** 1.1614*** 
  (0.1996) (0.2084) (0.2114) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      R-Sq 0.2147 0.1923 0.1566 
      Number of Observations 9295 9295 9295 
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Table 21 presents the regressions of the E-index on 3 different macroeconomic variables and various control variables for the period 2001 – 2009. Based on 
data from the NBER, we identify 4 recession years: 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Rdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is a recession year and 
0 otherwise. GDP growth is calculated using data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Default spread is calculated as the difference 
between the average annual yield on Moody’s Baa corporate bonds and the average annual yield on Moody’s Aaa corporate bonds. The E-index is calculated 
following Bebchuk et al. (2009). See Table 18 for details on the control variables. Year random effects is employed in order for the results not to be driven 
by a general trend towards a certain change in entrenchment overtime. Industry dummy variables are included to control for unobserved industry specific 
characteristics. Industry is defined following Fama and French 48-industry definition. Following White (1980), we compute robust standard errors. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 22. Industry Turnover, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm Value 
IndAdjusted Q (1) (2) (3) 
      Rdummy -0.0396 0.1378*** 0.0719 
  (0.0448) (0.0513) (0.0658) 
IndTurnover -0.4319* 
 
-0.2582 
  (0.2267) 
 
(0.2177) 
      Rdummy * IndTurnover 0.9285*** 
 
0.4927 
  (0.3348) 
 
(0.3258) 
      E-Index 
 
-0.0553*** -0.0556*** 
  
 
(0.0098) (0.0098) 
      Rdummy * E-Index 
 
-0.0118 -0.0099 
  
 
(0.0146) (0.0146) 
      Firm Size -0.0018 0.0062 0.0066 
  (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
      Capx/AT 1.9079*** 1.5376*** 1.5384*** 
  (0.4365) (0.4091) (0.4090) 
      Leverage -0.1144 -0.0848 -0.0870 
  (0.1179) (0.1183) (0.1182) 
      Liquidity 0.8024*** 0.7088*** 0.7101*** 
  (0.0907) (0.0921) (0.0921) 
      ROA 0.0502*** 0.0505*** 0.0505*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
      Board Size -0.0208*** -0.0174*** -0.0174*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
      CEO AGE -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
      Duality 0.0416** 0.0339 0.0327 
  (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0208) 
Percentage Independent -0.0033*** -0.0019*** -0.0018** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
      Intercept 0.3387 0.2253 0.2561 
  (0.2171) (0.2030) (0.2081) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      R-Sq 0.288 0.2998 0.3 
      Number of Observations 9870 9295 9295 
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This table presents the regressions of the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q on Rdummy, IndTurnover, turnover interaction (Rdummy * IndTurnover), E-index, 
entrenchment interaction (Rdummy * E-Index), and various control variables for the period 2001 – 2009. The industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is calculated as 
the difference between the firm’s Q and its industry median Q.  Based on data from the NBER, we identify 4 recession years: 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
Rdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is a recession year and 0 otherwise. IndTurnover is defined as the relative CEO turnover in a given 
industry in a given year. The E-index is calculated following Bebchuk et al. (2009).  Industry is defined following Fama and French 48-industry definition. 
See Table 18 for details on the control variables. A year random effects model is employed. Industry dummy variables are included to control for unobserved 
industry specific characteristics. Following White (1980), we compute robust standard errors. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The 
asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 23. Industry Turnover, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm Value 
IndAdjusted Q (1) (2) (3) 
      Default Dummy 0.0248 0.2381*** 0.1798*** 
  (0.0451) (0.0461) (0.0618) 
IndTurnover -0.3261 
 
-0.2403 
  (0.2117) 
 
(0.2037) 
    Default Dummy * IndTurnover 0.6437* 
 
0.4480 
  (0.3364) 
 
(0.3288) 
      E-Index 
 
-0.0303*** -0.0313*** 
  
 
(0.0090) (0.0090) 
      Default Dummy * E-Index 
 
-0.0491*** -0.0477*** 
  
 
(0.0136) (0.0136) 
      Firm Size -0.0004 0.0099 0.0098 
  (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
      Capx/AT 1.8528*** 1.5143*** 1.5159*** 
  (0.4398) (0.4139) (0.4140) 
      Leverage -0.1315 -0.1059 -0.1063 
  (0.1182) (0.1184) (0.1184) 
      Liquidity 0.8001*** 0.7168*** 0.7169*** 
  (0.0906) (0.0921) (0.0921) 
      ROA 0.0503*** 0.0507*** 0.0507*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
      Board Size -0.0211*** -0.0185*** -0.0184*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
      CEO AGE -0.0063*** -0.0061*** -0.0061*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
      Duality 0.0314 0.0172 0.0171 
  (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Percentage Independent -0.0029*** -0.0013* -0.0013* 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
      Intercept 0.2735 0.1013 0.1286 
  (0.2169) (0.2037) (0.2076) 
      Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      R-Sq 0.2887 0.3009 0.3011 
      Number of Observations 9870 9295 9295 
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This table presents the regressions of the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q on the Default Dummy, IndTurnover, turnover interaction (Default Dummy * 
IndTurnover), E-index, entrenchment interaction (Default Dummy * E-Index) and various control variables for the period 2001 – 2009. The industry 
adjusted Tobin’s Q is calculated as the difference between the firm’s Q and its industry median Q. Default spread is calculated as the difference between the 
average annual yield on Moody’s Baa corporate bonds and the average annual yield on Moody’s Aaa corporate bonds. In a given year, the default spread 
dummy variable is defined to be equal to 1 if the default spread is higher than the full sample period median default spread and zero otherwise. IndTurnover 
is defined as the relative CEO turnover in a given industry in a given year. The E-index is calculated following Bebchuk et al. (2009).  Industry is defined 
following Fama and French 48-industry definition. See Table 18 for details on the control variables. A year random effects model is employed. Industry 
dummy variables are included to control for unobserved industry specific characteristics. Following White (1980), we compute robust standard errors. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 24. Excess Turnover, Excess Entrenchment, and the Change in Firm Value 
ChangeIndAdjQ (1) (2) (3) 
      Excess Turnover 0.6808*** 
 
0.0482 
  (0.2430) 
 
(0.2550) 
      changee1 
 
-0.0832*** -0.0829*** 
  
 
(0.0117) (0.0120) 
      Firm Size 0.0195 -0.0086 -0.0085 
  (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
      Capx/AT 0.4038 0.2374 0.2367 
  (0.5539) (0.6715) (0.6705) 
      Leverage 0.1620 -0.0038 -0.0041 
  (0.1633) (0.1973) (0.1970) 
      Liquidity 0.2952** 0.3334** 0.3337** 
  (0.1390) (0.1355) (0.1354) 
      ROA 0.0037 0.0029 0.0029 
  (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
      Board Size 0.0158* 0.0386*** 0.0387*** 
  (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0082) 
      CEO AGE -0.0026 -0.0040* -0.0040* 
  (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
      Duality 0.1021*** 0.0673** 0.0671** 
  (0.0314) (0.0305) (0.0305) 
      Percentage Independent -0.0070*** -0.0048*** -0.0048*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
      Intercept -0.4256 -0.4023 -0.4038 
  (0.3326) (0.3700) (0.3702) 
      Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      R-Sq 0.057 0.0821 0.0821 
      Number of Observations 4052 3299 3299 
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This table presents the regressions of the ChangeIndAdjQ on ExcessTurnover, ExcessE, and various control variables during the recession period. Based on 
data from the NBER, we identify 4 recession years: 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009. ChangeIndAdjQ for each firm in a given recession year is defined as the 
industry adjusted Tobin’s Q less the median industry adjusted Tobin’s Q for that firm during the nonrecession period. ExcessTurnover for each firm in a 
given recession year is defined as relative industry turnover less the median relative industry turnover for that firm during nonrecession years. ExcessE for 
each firm in a given recession year is defined as the E-index less the median E-index for that firm during nonrecession years. Industry is defined following 
Fama and French 48-industry definition. See Table 18 for details on the control variables. A year random effects model is employed. Industry dummy 
variables are included to control for unobserved industry specific characteristics.  Following White (1980), we compute robust standard errors. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 25. Industry Turnover, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm Value: Two SLS Regressions 
IndAdjusted Q (1) (2) (3) 
Rdummy -0.0297 0.1413*** 0.0706 
  (0.0477) (0.0457) (0.0663) 
      IndTurnover -0.3693 
 
-0.2803 
  (0.2541) 
 
(0.2528) 
      Rdummy * IndTurnover 0.8759** 
 
  
  (0.3531) 
 
  
      E-Index 
 
-0.0534*** -0.0537*** 
  
 
(0.0107) (0.0107) 
      Rdummy * E-Index 
 
-0.0145 -0.0124 
  
 
(0.0146) (0.0147) 
      Firm Size 0.0153* 0.0160* 0.0164* 
  (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
      Capx/AT 2.0089*** 1.5673*** 1.5670*** 
  (0.2464) (0.2560) (0.2560) 
      Leverage -0.0965 -0.0911 -0.0937 
  (0.0704) (0.0705) (0.0705) 
      Liquidity 0.7778*** 0.6978*** 0.6992*** 
  (0.0695) (0.0702) (0.0702) 
      ROA 0.0488*** 0.0496*** 0.0496*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
      Board Size -0.0064*** -0.0066*** -0.0066*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
      CEO AGE -0.0244*** -0.0189*** -0.0190*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
      Duality 0.0295 0.0218 0.0205 
  (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) 
      Percentage Independent -0.0036*** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
      Intercept 0.2248 0.0722 0.1050 
  (0.1736) (0.1744) (0.1779) 
      Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      R-Sq 0.2865 0.3016 0.3018 
      Number of Observations 9214 8593 8593 
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This table presents two stage least squares regression to account for any possible endogeneity between: (i) Industry Turnover and Firm Value, and/or (ii) 
Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Value. The sample period extends from 2001 till 2009. In columns 1 and 3, we use the one period lagged relative 
industry turnover (LagIndTurnover) and the multiplication of lagged relative industry turnover by the recession dummy variable 
(Rdummy*LagIndTurnover) as instruments for the relative industry turnover and the industry turnover interaction variable. In columns 2 and 3, we use the 
one period lag E-index (lagE) and the multiplication of the lag E-index by the recession dummy variable (Rdummy*lagE) as instruments for the E-index and 
the entrenchment interaction variable. Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is the difference between the firm’s Q and its industry median Q.  Based on NBER data, 
we identify 4 recession years: 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Rdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is a recession year and 0 otherwise. 
IndTurnover is defined as the relative CEO turnover in a given industry in a given year. E-index is calculated following Bebchuk et al. (2009).  Industry is 
defined following Fama and French 48-industry definition. See Table 18 for details on the control variables. Industry dummy variables are included to 
control for unobserved industry specific characteristics. Following White (1980), we compute robust standard errors. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
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Table 26. Industry Turnover, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm Value: Two SLS Regressions 
IndAdjusted Q (1) (2) (3) 
Default Dummy 0.0299 0.2540*** 0.1939*** 
  (0.0470) (0.0434) (0.0633) 
      IndTurnover -0.2760 
 
-0.2525 
  (0.2510) 
 
(0.2482) 
      Default Dummy * IndTurnover 0.6168* 
 
0.4592 
  (0.3499) 
 
(0.3499) 
      E-Index 
 
-0.0292*** -0.0301*** 
  
 
(0.0096) (0.0097) 
      Default Dummy * E-Index 
 
-0.0540*** -0.0524*** 
  
 
(0.0139) (0.0140) 
      Firm Size 0.0165* 0.0189** 0.0188** 
  (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
      Capx/AT 1.9595*** 1.5465*** 1.5476*** 
  (0.2466) (0.2563) (0.2563) 
      Leverage -0.1153 -0.1153 -0.1158 
  (0.0705) (0.0705) (0.0705) 
      Liquidity 0.7752*** 0.7046*** 0.7050*** 
  (0.0694) (0.0701) (0.0701) 
      ROA 0.0488*** 0.0498*** 0.0498*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
      Board Size -0.0061*** -0.0062*** -0.0062*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
      CEO AGE -0.0248*** -0.0205*** -0.0204*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
      Duality 0.0184 0.0067 0.0066 
  (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
      Percentage Independent -0.0031*** -0.0015** -0.0015** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
      Intercept 0.1566 -0.0407 -0.0116 
  (0.1732) (0.1742) (0.1775) 
      Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
      R-Sq 0.2874 0.3031 0.3032 
      Number of Observations 9214 8593 8593 
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This table presents two stage least squares regression to account for any possible endogeneity between: (i) Industry Turnover and Firm Value, and/or (ii) 
Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Value. The sample period extends from 2001 till 2009. In columns 1 and 3, we use the one period lagged relative 
industry turnover (LagIndTurnover) and the multiplication of lagged relative industry turnover by the default dummy variable as instruments for the relative 
industry turnover and the industry turnover interaction variable. In columns 2 and 3, we use the one period lag E-index (lagE) and the multiplication of the 
lag E-index by the default dummy variable as instruments for the E-index and the entrenchment interaction variable. Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is the 
difference between the firm’s Q and its industry median Q. Default spread is the difference between the average annual yield on Moody’s Baa corporate 
bonds and the average annual yield on Moody’s Aaa corporate bonds. In a given year, the default spread dummy variable is defined to be equal to 1 if the 
default spread is higher than the full sample period median default spread and zero otherwise. IndTurnover is defined as the relative CEO turnover in a given 
industry in a given year. E-index is calculated following Bebchuk et al. (2009).  Industry is defined following Fama and French 48-industry definition. See 
Table 18 for details on the control variables. Industry dummy variables are included to control for unobserved industry specific characteristics. Following 
White (1980), we compute robust standard errors. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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